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RESUSCITATING CONSENT
MEGAN S. WRIGHT *
Abstract: The scholarly focus on autonomy in healthcare decision making largely has been on information about, rather than consent to, medical treatment.
There is an assumption that if a patient has complete information and understanding about a proposed medical intervention, then they will choose the treatment
their physician thinks is best. True respect for patient autonomy means that
treatment refusal, whether informed or not, should always be an option. But there
is evidence that healthcare providers sometimes ignore treatment refusals and resort to force to treat patients over their contemporaneous objection, which may
be facilitated by the incapacity exception to informed consent requirements. This
Article uses the case of treatment over objection to resuscitate analysis of consent. This Article asserts that the nature of autonomy in medical decision making
is misunderstood, which can lead to wrongful use of the incapacity exception and
subsequent harm. Autonomy has become erroneously conflated with an individual’s capacity for rational decision making, obscuring the reality that the exercise
of autonomy is mediated by the body. That is, autonomy is not solely cognitive,
but also corporeal. Indeed, bodily integrity is a necessary component of autonomy, and so violating bodily integrity by treating patients over their objection is
inconsistent with respect for autonomy. Further, when healthcare providers violate patients’ bodily integrity, there can be significant harms to wellbeing. Moreover, if providers misuse the incapacity exception in order to treat patients over
their objection, this nullifies informed consent law. This Article argues that patients should not be treated over their objection even when providers do not perceive refusals to be rational because such treatment is inconsistent with respect
© 2022, Megan S. Wright. All rights reserved.
* Megan S. Wright, J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Law, Medicine, and Sociology and Affiliate Faculty at The Rock Ethics Institute at The Pennsylvania State University and Adjunct Assistant
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for her feedback on this work in its various forms.
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for patient autonomy and bodily integrity, promotion of wellbeing, and maintenance of the rule of law. In order to prevent or remedy treatment over objection,
this Article argues that states should adopt laws that provide adults with absolute
legal capacity to refuse medical treatment unless a court overrides their decision.
The proposed law thus would prevent healthcare providers from disqualifying
their patients from refusing treatment even when there are questions about the
patient’s decisional capacity.

INTRODUCTION
Because adult patients are entitled to make their own healthcare decisions, 1 healthcare providers must obtain their patient’s informed consent prior
to providing treatment, 2 which is a means to respect patient autonomy. 3 Securing informed consent from patients is both an ethical and legal requirement,
and healthcare providers may incur liability for treating patients without their
informed consent. 4
Promoting patient autonomy by seeking informed consent, however, has
largely failed. 5 Most of the studies assessing informed consent find that patients are largely ignorant about the treatments that they choose, along with the
attendant risks and benefits, if they perceive themselves to be choosing at all. 6
Patients’ lack of understanding about medical treatment is due to inherent cognitive biases; what information healthcare providers offer patients; how providers frame the information; and the difficulty lay persons, especially when
they are sick, have in understanding complex medical interventions. 7
1
See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body
. . . .”).
2
See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3
JESSICA W. BERG, PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CHARLES W. LIDZ & LISA S. PARKER, INFORMED
CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 15–16 (2d ed. 2001).
4
Id. at 12–13.
5
See, e.g., George J. Annas, Informed Consent: Charade or Choice?, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 10,
11 (2017) (“Informed consent . . . [is] a superficial charade rather than an autonomous choice.”). To
be autonomous, healthcare decisions must be voluntary, intentional, and understood. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 104 (7th ed. 2013).
6
See Theresa S. Drought & Barbara A. Koenig, “Choice” in End-of-Life Decision Making: Researching Fact or Fiction?, 42 THE GERONTOLOGIST (SPECIAL ISSUE III) 114, 116 (2002). See generally CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL
DECISIONS (1998) (summarizing empirical research on how patients make medical decisions).
7
See generally NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch & Christopher T. Robertson eds., 2016) (discussing how to improve
healthcare decision making); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (discussing
rational and irrational modes of thinking); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (advocating for changes in
policy to improve decision making and promote wellbeing); Carl E. Schneider & Michael H. Farrell,
Information, Decisions, and the Limits of Informed Consent, in 3 LAW AND MEDICINE: CURRENT
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Because of the primacy of autonomy in American law 8 and medical decision-making ethics, 9 as well as the importance of autonomy to patients, 10 there
has been a significant scholarly undertaking to change how providers disclose
medical information so that patients can truly understand their healthcare options. For example, legal scholars have advocated for using certified patient
decision-making aids such as videos or decision grids in the informed consent
process. 11
As such, the scholarly focus on autonomy and healthcare decision making
largely has been on information about medical treatment, and much less about
the issue of consent to medical treatment. Indeed, there is an assumption in the
law, bioethics, and clinical literature that if a patient has complete information
and understanding about a proposed medical intervention, then the patient will
choose the treatment their physician thinks is in their best interests. 12 However,
despite how well-informed patients are, autonomous healthcare decision making is impossible if patients do not consent to treatment they receive, and in
particular, if providers override their treatment refusals.
True respect for patient autonomy in healthcare decision making means
that treatment refusal should always be an option. 13 Though empirical research
and court cases demonstrate that patients sometimes refuse both routine and
life-sustaining medical treatment, there is also evidence that patient treatment
refusals, 14 whether contemporaneous or conveyed through advance directives,
LEGAL ISSUES 107 (Michael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., 2000) (arguing that there are limits
to rationality when people are sick). Patients may also have limited English proficiency or be unable
to hear their healthcare providers, factors that contribute to poor understanding if patients are not
accommodated.
8
See generally Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL.
L. REV. 1705 (1992) (canvassing areas of law where autonomy is protected).
9
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 5, at 101–49.
10
Many patients report a desire to participate in decisions about their healthcare. See, e.g., Megan
S. Wright, Dementia, Autonomy, and Supported Healthcare Decisionmaking, 79 MD. L. REV. 257,
273–74 (2020) (summarizing “decision-making preferences of persons with . . . dementia”).
11
See generally Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429 (2006) (proposing that informed
consent law incorporate shared decision making); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Certified Patient Decision
Aids: Solving Persistent Problems with Informed Consent Law, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12 (2017)
(discussing the modern change from traditional informed consent practices in healthcare to patient
decision-making aids models); Nadia N. Sawicki, Patient Protection and Decision-Aid Quality: Regulatory and Tort Law Approaches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 621 (2012) (discussing how best to regulate the
quality of patient decision aids).
12
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 227 (“[T]he term informed consent itself suggests that patients
are expected to agree to be treated rather than to decline treatment.”).
13
Id.
14
See, e.g., T. van Kleffens & E. van Leeuwen, Physicians’ Evaluations of Patients’ Decisions to
Refuse Oncological Treatment, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 131, 134 tbl.2 (2005) (reporting patients’ reasons
for refusing recommended cancer treatment).
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are sometimes ignored by healthcare providers who may resort to force or deception when treating patients over their objection in hospitals or seek a surrogate to authorize the undesired treatment. 15
Scholars have examined treatment over objection 16 in some specific medical and legal contexts; for example, psychiatric, 17 public health, obstetric, 18 and
advance directives declining life-sustaining medical care. 19 But the law and ethics of medical treatment over contemporaneous objection for the general patient
population have received scant scholarly attention. 20 This Article aims to fill this
gap by focusing on medical treatment—not necessarily life-sustaining—over
contemporaneous patient objection in acute care hospitals. 21 This Article uses
15
See generally Elizabeth Kukura, Obstetric Violence, 106 GEO. L.J. 721 (2018) (documenting
nonconsensual treatment that some women experience during childbirth); Holly Fernandez Lynch,
Michele Mathes & Nadia N. Sawicki, Compliance with Advance Directives: Wrongful Living and Tort
Law Incentives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133 (2008) (describing cases in which advance directives were not
followed and possible tort remedies); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Unwanted Cesareans
and Obstetric Violence, 28 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 163 (2017) [hereinafter Pope, Unwanted Cesareans]
(describing instances of nonconsensual obstetric treatment); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing:
New Penalties for Disregarding Advance Directives and Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 28 J. CLINICAL
ETHICS 74 (2017) [hereinafter Pope, New Penalties] (discussing common types of undesired healthcare
treatment at the end of life and possible legal sanctions for disregarding patients’ advance directives);
Nadia N. Sawicki, A New Life for Wrongful Living, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 279 (2014) (reviewing
legal recourse for patients when healthcare providers do not respect their advance directives declining
life-sustaining medical care).
16
I distinguish between nonconsensual treatment and treatment over objection in this Article.
Nonconsensual treatment means that the patient has not given permission for the treatment or the
patient has agreed to treatment under undue influence. In contrast, in the case of treatment over objection, there is evidence of refusal, and force or deception may be required to treat over objection.
17
See generally ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY ILL (2002) (discussing coercive treatment in context of mental illness); GEORGE
SZMUKLER, MEN IN WHITE COATS: TREATMENT UNDER COERCION (2018) (discussing mental health
laws in psychiatric treatment).
18
See generally Kukura, supra note 15 (describing nonconsensual obstetric treatment); Pope,
Unwanted Cesareans, supra note 15 (describing instances of unwanted cesareans and associated legal
implications).
19
See generally Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 15 (proposing legal remedies for patients who
receive treatment refused in their advance directive); Pope, New Penalties, supra note 15 (documenting cases of life-sustaining treatment over patient objection); Sawicki, supra note 15 (exploring legal
remedies for patients who receive life-sustaining treatment over their refusal).
20
But see, e.g., Mark Christopher Navin, Jason Adam Wasserman & Mark H. Haimann, Treatment Over Objection—Moral Reasons for Reluctance, 94 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1936, 1938 (2019).
21
Acute care hospitals are the focus of this Article because they are sites with the equipment and
staff necessary to treat patients over their objection unlike many outpatient settings. This Article will
not focus on medical interventions over objection in psychiatric, jails/prison, human subjects research,
or public health contexts. These contexts are outside of the scope of this Article because they draw on
different bodies of law and different assumptions and principles. In the case of mental health treatment, for example, there may be a presumption of patient incompetence, whereas in medical treatment, there is a presumption of patient competence. For similar reasons, this Article only focuses on
adult patients rather than including pediatric patients.
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the case of treatment over patient objection to make two novel theoretical contributions: (1) autonomy in healthcare decision making is not solely cognitive,
but also corporeal, and should be understood to include bodily integrity; and
(2) healthcare providers contribute to the erosion of the rule of law when they
provide medical treatment over their patients’ objection.
First, despite various definitions of autonomy in the philosophical literature, in healthcare settings, autonomy in medical decision making has become
conflated with an individual’s capacity for rational decision making.22 But conflating autonomy and rationality in clinical practice obscures other important
aspects of autonomous healthcare decision making, identified in the foundational legal case that directs that “[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.” 23
Though there is a minimum rationality requirement embedded in this principle
of autonomy (sound mind), autonomy in this context is less about rational decision making and more about maintaining bodily integrity, which can be defined as “a person’s exclusive use and control over his or her body.” 24 This Article argues for a return to the understanding that bodily integrity is a necessary
component of autonomy, and so violating bodily integrity by treating patients
over their objection is inconsistent with respect for patient autonomy. 25 In
short, autonomy is impossible if others can do what they want to another person’s body. Thus, the provision of medical treatment should not occur without
patient authorization, even if providers do not perceive the refusal as “informed” or “understood,” that is, rational.
Second, when healthcare providers treat patients over their objection in
the absence of legal exceptions to informed consent requirements or stateSee generally John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYC. OF
PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/ [https://perma.cc/U4SF-PF5R] (June 29,
2020) (discussing “the concept of autonomy” and its context in moral, social, and political philosophy). This conflation is evident when providers use formal capacity assessments to remove decisionmaking authority from their patients. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 5, at 114–15.
23
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), and superseded by statute, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d
(McKinney 2021), as stated by Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
24
Jonathan Herring & Jesse Wall, The Nature and Significance of the Right to Bodily Integrity,
76 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 566, 576 (2017).
25
Healthcare providers may disregard their decisionally impaired patients’ contemporaneous refusal and instead look to their advance directive or surrogate decision makers to authorize the medical
treatment and understand their treatment over patient objection to be consistent with respect for patient autonomy. But current understandings of autonomy show that even patients with decisional impairments may be capable of autonomy if they have proper support and accommodations, which
makes such treatment disrespectful of contemporaneous autonomy. Wright, supra note 10, at 321–24;
Megan S. Wright, Dementia, Healthcare Decision Making, and Disability Law, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 25, 30–31 (2019). Providers who ignore advance directives are disrespectful of precedent autonomy.
22
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mandated legal process to override treatment refusals, those healthcare providers are violating their professional duties to follow the law. 26 This nullifies informed consent laws and contributes to an erosion of the rule of private law.
That is, treating patients over their objection is not solely paternalistic, but also
has wider implications for the stability and legitimacy of the legal system. To
the extent that the rule of law is valuable, then providers should not treat patients over their objection in the absence of legal process, and courts should
hold providers accountable when providers engage in medical battery. This
Article will thus argue that the law should ensure that patients always have
legal capacity to refuse medical treatment unless a court decides otherwise.
This Article hopes to resuscitate analysis of consent in healthcare decision
making and proceeds as follows. Part I describes the law and ethics of informed consent; empirical research on patients’ and healthcare providers’ attitudes about and practice of informed consent; and patients’ experiences receiving treatment over their objection and healthcare providers’ reasons for doing
so. 27 Part II advances the normative argument that treatment over patient objection is inconsistent with respect for patient autonomy, of which bodily integrity is a necessary component, has a negative effect on both patient and provider wellbeing, and is inconsistent with the rule of law, and thus should rarely,
if ever, occur. 28 Part III proposes legal changes to ensure that treatments over
patient objection do not occur in the absence of legal process that is protective
of patients’ bodily integrity. 29 Specifically, Part III argues that states should
pass laws that provide adults with absolute legal capacity to refuse medical
treatment unless a court overrides their decision; that is, the law would prevent
healthcare providers from disqualifying their patients from making the decision
to refuse treatment even when there are questions about the patient’s decisional
capacity. Finally, the Article concludes by addressing counterarguments and offering a conceptualization of informed consent as “informed enough assent.” 30
I. INFORMED CONSENT LAW, ETHICS, AND PRACTICE
Section A of this Part first summarizes informed consent law and ethics. 31
Section B of this Part then surveys empirical literature on healthcare decision
See, e.g., AMA Code of Medical Ethics: AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, AM. MED. ASS’N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/principles-of-medical-ethics.
pdf [https://perma.cc/X964-8W86 ] (June 2001) (“A physician shall respect the law . . . .”).
27
See infra notes 31–142 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 143–223 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 224–250 and accompanying text.
30
See infra notes 251–309 and accompanying text. For specific explanation of what is meant by
“informed enough assent,” see infra notes 310–318 and accompanying text.
31
See infra notes 34–62 and accompanying text.
26
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making, describing how the legal doctrine of informed consent is often not
achieved in practice and summarizing legal scholars’ proposals to address
problems with physician disclosure and patient understanding. 32 Section C of
this Part then concludes by discussing failures of consent, specifically treatment over patient objection. 33
A. Law and Ethics of Informed Consent
Adults have a long-established legal right to make their own healthcare
decisions. 34 This Section will provide a brief overview of the law and ethics of
informed consent, including exceptions to the requirement for informed consent and understanding informed consent as shared decision making.
1. Overview of Informed Consent Law
Healthcare decision-making law requires that healthcare providers obtain
patient consent (authorization or permission) prior to medical treatment; if the
patient has not consented, then the healthcare provider has committed medical
battery regardless of whether a good medical outcome has been achieved. 35
Consent is required even for life-sustaining treatment, which patients have a
legal right to decline. 36
The requirement that healthcare providers obtain patient consent to medical treatment has changed over time. Now, healthcare providers may be liable
not only for not obtaining a patient’s authorization for treatment, but also if
they have not obtained informed consent from their patients. 37 Providers have
an affirmative duty to disclose information about their patient’s medical condition; the proposed medical intervention; the reason for the intervention and its
risks and benefits; and other options besides the recommended intervention
including no treatment. 38 If a patient consents to medical treatment in the ab-

See infra notes 63–96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 97–142 and accompanying text.
34
See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by
Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), and superseded by statute, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2805-d (McKinney 2021), as stated by Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
35
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 19 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019).
36
See BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 228, 230; Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The
Case for Relational Nudges in End-of-Life Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REV. 1062,
1068–77 (2018).
37
When patients bring legal claims after there have been problems in the informed consent process, these claims tend to be in negligence rather than battery. BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 135.
38
Id. at 12, 53–65 (describing elements of required disclosure, which differ by jurisdiction, as
does the standard for assessing whether physicians have met their disclosure duty).
32
33
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sence of complete and correct information when they otherwise would not, 39
and subsequently suffers harm, the provider may be liable. 40
The maintenance and protection of bodily integrity justifies the patient
consent to treatment requirement, 41 but the development of the doctrine of informed consent is meant to promote patient self-determination. 42 That is, it is
no longer sufficient to obtain patient permission for a medical intervention, but
patients also must have information necessary to make choices. 43 The legal
requirements for informed consent are meant to increase patient autonomy and
decrease provider paternalism by offsetting the power clinicians have in the
healthcare setting. 44
2. Informed Consent Exceptions and Scope Conditions
There are several exceptions to informed consent requirements recognized in law and medical ethics. 45 For example, it may not be possible to obtain informed consent during a medical emergency, in which case treatment
39
See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[I]t is normally impossible to obtain a consent worthy of the name unless the physician first elucidates the options and the
perils for the patient’s edification.”).
40
This liability will mostly be in tort. See, e.g., Pope, supra note 11, at 15–16. Patients could in
rare circumstances bring constitutional claims; the constitutional right “to refus[e] unwanted medical
treatment” under the Fourteenth Amendment is not applicable in most cases of nonconsensual treatment, however, given that “state actors are [likely not] involved.” Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note
15, at 139–40; Sawicki, supra note 15, at 295–96. If the nonconsensual treatment occurs in a public
hospital or is ordered by a court, then it may constitute a violation of the individual’s constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment. Kukura, supra note 15, at 793 n.462. There are also cases where
paramedics treat or transport competent patients over their objections, and some courts have held that
this could lead to claims for both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Green v.
City of New York, 359 F. App’x 197, 198–201 (2d Cir. 2009). There are also possible Eighth
Amendment claims if a patient is treated over their objection while in prison. Sawicki, supra note 15,
at 296 & n.107 (first citing Klavan v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 60 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D. Pa. 1999);
and then citing Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987)).
41
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 41–42, 49, 132; King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 438; see also
Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (“[E]very person has a right to complete immunity
of his person from physical interference of others . . . .”), overruled in part by Genzel v. Halvorson, 80
N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1957). Psychic integrity is also protected and can be addressed through emotional
distress torts. BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 42.
42
King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 438. Indeed, scholars have argued that medical battery
claims are “narrow and limited” and that negligent informed consent, although imperfect, is more
protective of patients’ rights and autonomy interests. Pope, supra note 11, at 13–17.
43
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 49 (“The purpose of the simple consent requirement—protecting
patients from unwanted interferences with their bodily integrity—was important, but limited in comparison with the other purpose of informed consent, which is to permit patients to make informed
choices about their health care.”).
44
The primary justifications for and goals of informed consent are “promotion of [patient] autonomy and well-being.” Id. at 11, 16, 18–20; see also id. at 20–21, 75–76, 140, 146 (describing other
values and principles).
45
See id. at 75–93 (describing informed consent exceptions).
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can be provided without patient authorization. 46 This is because “consent is
[understood] to be implied,” based on a reasonable person standard, and because of the likelihood of irreparable harm if medical intervention does not
occur. 47 Another example of the exception to the requirement to obtain patient
permission is when a court orders a particular treatment, which may occur
when a person has a contagious but treatable disease and their treatment refusal poses risks to third parties. 48
It is also necessary to note the scope conditions of the right to make medical decisions. First, only adults are legally entitled to make their own
healthcare decisions. 49 All other decisions are made by parents or guardians on
behalf of minor children, although it is considered good clinical practice to
involve and obtain the assent of the pediatric patient. 50
Second, generally only patients with decisional capacity—competent patients 51—are legally entitled to make contemporaneous medical decisions. 52
Even if a patient is deemed to lack decisional capacity, 53 healthcare providers
46
Id. at 76; see Informed Consent: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent [https://perma.cc/WB5A-UK5Z].
47
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 76, 78 (“The emergency exception assumes that the patient
would have consented if he had been fully informed. When there is strong evidence to the contrary,
the physician may not override the patient’s wishes.”).
48
See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope & Heather Michelle Bughman, Legal Briefing: Coerced
Treatment and Involuntary Confinement for Contagious Disease, 26 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 73 (2015)
(describing legal standards and rules regarding involuntary treatment in the public health context).
49
There are limited exceptions via statute or common law for mature minors to make certain
types of medical decisions, such as reproductive decisions. BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 97, 233.
50
See, e.g., id. at 97–98; Pediatric Decision Making: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.2.1, AM.
MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/pediatric-decision-making [https://
perma.cc/W3NU-YVXY] Courts may require treatment when parents decide to reject life-saving
treatment for their children. BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 233.
51
Decisional capacity is typically defined as “communicating a choice, understanding relevant information, appreciating the current situation and its consequences, and manipulating information rationally.” Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1635, 1635 (1988). There are evolving understandings of capacity
in the treatment refusal context, however, although they still rely on these four criteria. Mark Christopher Navin, Abram L. Brummett & Jason Adam Wasserman, Three Kinds of Decision-Making Capacity for Refusing Medical Interventions, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Aug. 3, 2021, at 1, 3–5, https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15265161.2021.1941423 [https://perma.cc/5R43-P9BM] (describing
the capacity to refuse treatment based on its incompatibility with a patient’s goals or willingness to
endure certain burdens). Incapacity can either be “global” or “specific”; that is, a patient may be able
to make no decisions at all, or may be able to make some but not all decisions. BERG ET AL., supra
note 3, at 96; Linda Ganzini, Ladislav Volicer, William Nelson & Arthur Derse, Pitfalls in Assessment
of Decision-Making Capacity, 44 PSYCHOSOMATICS 237, 241 (2003).
52
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 106.
53
Patients can be deemed incompetent by a court during guardianship proceedings or, more
commonly, deemed incapacitated by their physician after a capacity assessment. Id. at 95–96, 106–09,
117–19, 232. Judicial review of decisional capacity is more common for end-of-life decisions, involuntary psychiatric treatment decisions, or particular medical interventions such as sterilization. Id. at
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must still obtain authorization prior to a medical intervention. 54 State laws anticipate circumstances where a patient is unable to make their own decisions.
These state laws provide the option to consent to or refuse treatment through
an advance directive—prior directions or selection of a healthcare power of
attorney made when the patient was competent—or in the absence of advance
directives, permit family members or court-appointed guardians—surrogate or
substitute decision makers—to authorize or refuse treatment on the incapacitated patient’s behalf. 55 In a growing number of states, however, persons who
otherwise would be considered incapacitated may be able to make their own
healthcare decisions at the time the decision needs to be made by making use
of formal supported decision making, wherein they receive decision-making
assistance from trusted supporters. 56 Though advance directives and surrogate
healthcare decision-making laws are designed to respect patient autonomy
from a prior point in time, 57 supported decision making can enable the respect
118, 232. Capacity assessments are controversial and have been critiqued for bias and lack of reliability and validity. Id. at 101; Ganzini et al., supra note 51, at 241; Jennifer Moye & Daniel C. Marson,
Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity in Older Adults: An Emerging Area of Practice and Research, 62B J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B P3, P7 (2007). Further, capacity assessments may be used to
control patients by only being conducted when a patient disagrees with their physician’s recommendation and not when patients agree with their physician’s recommendation, even if the patient has decisional impairments. BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 101, 103–06; Ganzini et al., supra note 51, at 238,
241; C. Umapathy et al., Competency Evaluations on the Consultation-Liaison Service: Some Overt
and Covert Aspects, 40 PSYCHOSOMATICS 28, 32 (1999).
54
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 94, 112, 119–20.
55
See, e.g., UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 2(c), 5(a), 11(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994)
(noting the presumption of capacity and that advance directives and surrogates should only be relied
upon when a patient is incapacitated); see also BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 95, 109–13, 232 (describing how physicians should engage in the informed consent process with the incapacitated patient’s surrogate).
56
Recent developments in some states’ disability and guardianship laws try to ensure that patients
with cognitive disabilities retain contemporaneous decision-making authority despite their decisional
impairments by facilitating the use of formal supported decision making. Supported decision-making
laws comply with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities directive that everyone is
entitled to equal legal capacity. G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 12, § 2, Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD] (“[P]ersons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity
on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”). With formal supported decision making, persons
with cognitive impairments enter into agreements with supporters who assist with obtaining information, understanding and thinking through options, and communicating decisions to third parties.
See generally Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported DecisionMaking: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111 (2013) (describing supported decision making and how this model compares to guardianship and shared decision making in
medical contexts); Wright, supra note 10 (describing supported decision-making laws and applying
this model to patients with dementia); Wright, supra note 25 (describing how supported decision making may be a required accommodation for patients with dementia under federal disability law). Persons who otherwise would be disqualified by physicians or courts from making their own healthcare
decisions may be able to do so with these decision-making accommodations.
57
Surrogates are directed to follow a patient’s advance directive or to make healthcare decisions
on the basis of the patient’s “values, goals, [and] preferences,” a standard that respects the patient’s
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of a patient’s contemporaneous autonomous decision to consent to or refuse
medical treatment. 58
3. Informed Consent, Medical Ethics, and Shared Decision Making
Medical ethics affirm the importance of informed consent to medical
treatment. The American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics
endorses the principle of respect for patient autonomy and the value of informed consent and directs that patients have the right “[t]o make decisions
about the care the physician recommends,” “to have those decisions respected,” and to “accept or refuse any recommended medical intervention.” 59
Though the Code states that “[a]utonomous, competent patients control
the decisions that direct their health care,” 60 shared decision making is also an
ethical commitment and considered good patient-centered care. 61 In the model
of shared decision making, physicians disclose information about the patient’s
diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment options, and the patient conveys their “values, goals, [and] preferences”; together the patient and their healthcare provid-

autonomy. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, §§ 2(e), 5(f); BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 115. For
temporarily incapacitated patients, their right to future autonomy is protected. For permanently incapacitated patients, their right to precedent autonomy is protected. See, e.g., UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, §§ 2(e), 5(f); BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 114–15, 232.
58
Wright, supra note 10, at 321–23; Wright, supra note 25, at 30–31; Megan S. Wright, Dementia, Cognitive Transformation, and Supported Decision Making, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Aug. 2020, at 88,
89–90.
59
Patient Rights: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.1.3, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/ethics/patient-rights [https://perma.cc/8G6P-G7UJ]; see also Comm. on Ethics, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, ACOG Committee Opinion No. 819: Informed Consent and Shared Decision Making in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 137 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY,
at e34, e35 (Feb. 2021) [hereinafter ACOG Opinion No. 819], https://www.acog.org/-/media/project/
acog/acogorg/clinical/files/committee-opinion/articles/2021/02/informed-consent-and-shareddecision-making-in-obstetrics-and-gynecology.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2KC-QRKT] (“Informed consent is a practical application of the bioethics principle of respect for patient autonomy and selfdetermination as well as the legal right of a patient to bodily integrity.”). The AMA Code can be considered a source of “soft law” in the form of policy statements that governs members of the Association. Indeed, many physicians give great consideration to “standards and recommendations from professional medical bodies” when “making . . . ethically complex medical decision[s],” indicating the
influence of AMA guidance. R.E. Lawrence & F.A. Curlin, Autonomy, Religion, and Clinical Decisions: Findings from a National Physician Survey, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 214, 215 (2009).
60
Patient Responsibilities: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.1.4, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.
ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/patient-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/P2YV-PN7A].
61
See generally Michael J. Barry & Susan Edgman-Levitan, Shared Decision Making—The Pinnacle of Patient-Centered Care, 366 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 780 (2012) (advocating for use of shared
decision making to increase patient wellbeing); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
PATIENT (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2002) (1984) (discussing the relationship of the physician and
patient and advocating for shared decision making).
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ers, and possibly family members, decide which medical interventions to pursue in light of the patient’s subjective wellbeing. 62
B. Empirical Research on Informed Consent
Both law and medical ethics require physicians to obtain informed consent from patients prior to providing medical treatment; however, a significant
body of research has demonstrated that the ideal of informed consent rarely
matches the reality of healthcare decision making. This Section first will describe healthcare provider and patient perspectives on and experiences with
healthcare decision making, then will discuss scholarly responses to failures of
informed consent.
1. Healthcare Decision-Making Practices and Perspectives
Empirical research has overwhelmingly demonstrated that healthcare
providers are not consistently engaging in the legally-mandated informed consent process with their patients, nor are they achieving shared decision-making
ideals.
Indeed, with respect to physician disclosure requirements, studies have
shown that providers spend “less than 5 percent of a typical medical encounter
. . . providing information to patients.” 63 Another study found that physicians
disclose less than a third of the required disclosures. 64
Healthcare providers’ disclosure practices do not match most patients’
preferences. Patients report wanting much more information than they receive

See Barry & Edgman-Levitan, supra note 61, at 780–81 (describing family involvement); see
also King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 431 (describing shared decision making). See generally Dan
W. Brock, The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between Physicians and Patients, 1 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 28 (1991) (discussing the challenges of implementing shared decision making); Jennifer
Blumenthal-Barby et al., Potential Unintended Consequences of Recent Shared Decision Making
Policy Initiatives, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 1876 (2019) (describing problems with implementing shared
decision making); Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical DecisionMaking: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85 (2010) (describing shared
decision making).
63
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 184 (citing Howard Waitzkin, Doctor-Patient Communication:
Clinical Implications of Social Scientific Research, 252 JAMA 2441 (1984)). Patients may receive
more information when a surgical intervention is to be performed. Id. at 148. There are likely reimbursement and time constraints that influence this lack of disclosure. Elizabeth C. Thomas, Sarah
Bauerle Bass & Laura A. Siminoff, Beyond Rationality: Expanding the Practice of Shared Decision
Making in Modern Medicine, SOC. SCI. & MED., May 2021, art. 113900, at 1, 3–4 (2021).
64
King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 461–62 (citing Clarence H. Braddock III et al., How Doctors and Patients Discuss Routine Clinical Decisions: Informed Decision Making in the Outpatient
Setting, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 339, 339–42 (1997)); see also KATZ, supra note 61, at 58 (arguing that lack of disclosure is intentional).
62
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from their healthcare providers. 65 For example, in one study, many patients
were not even informed about the surgery that would be performed on them,
nor about alternative procedures. 66 Other studies have revealed that when patients do receive the legally-required information, many feel this information is
insufficient, which leads them to “doubt whether the [doctor’s decisions are in]
their best interests” or just a matter of healthcare provider preference or convenience. 67 Patients emphasize the importance of understanding what will
happen and having the opportunity to ask questions. 68 Indeed, patients desire
to engage in shared decision making with their providers, but report that this is
not occurring in practice. 69
Even when physicians meet the disclosure requirements, studies and case
reports have demonstrated that patients do not understand the medical treatment to which they agree. 70 This lack of understanding is in large part because
much of the information patients receive is complicated, and they need more
time to understand their diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment options. 71
There are several reasons why healthcare providers may not engage in
shared decision making with their patients or even meet their minimal discloBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 148.
See, e.g., Vikki Entwistle et al., Which Surgical Decisions Should Patients Participate in and
How? Reflections on Women’s Recollections of Discussions About Variants of Hysterectomy, 62 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 499, 501–02 (2006) (reporting that a significant number of study patients undergoing a
hysterectomy were not informed about surgical options, the “advantages and disadvantages of [the]
different types” of procedures available, or even about what procedure they would be undergoing).
67
Id. at 502–04; see BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 156, 178 (summarizing studies demonstrating
that regardless of whether patients want to make their own medical decisions, they desire more information); Carole Doherty, Charitini Stavropoulou, Mark NK Saunders & Tracey Brown, The Consent
Process: Enabling or Disabling Patients’ Active Participation?, 21 HEALTH 205, 213–14, 218 (2017)
(reporting that although patients may not desire to make their own decisions, they want more information about the effects of the intervention); Sawicki, supra note 11, at 629–30 (summarizing studies
demonstrating that providers are not disclosing required information to patients); Christina Sinding et
al., “I Like to Be an Informed Person but . . .” Negotiating Responsibility for Treatment Decisions in
Cancer Care, 71 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1094, 1099 (2010) (noting that patients desire more information
and stronger treatment recommendations from their physicians).
68
Doherty et al., supra note 67, at 214–16; see BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 85.
69
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE 351 (2015) (“People feel that explanations are
rushed, issues are not explained, choices are not understood, and clinicians do not listen.”). This feeling is due to lack of time and poor provider communication. Sawicki, supra note 11, at 630–31; see
also Pope, supra note 11, at 12.
70
For summaries of studies, see BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 4–8, 65, 154–55; SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 35–47; Pope, supra note 11, at 12; Sawicki, supra note 11, at 629–30.
71
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 28; Sinding et al., supra note 67, at 1096; Cindy Brach, Making
Informed Consent an Informed Choice, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.health
affairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20190403.965852/full/ [https://perma.cc/GG43-D42P]. Patients may
also not understand English or be hard-of-hearing, and if they are not accommodated through interpreters or other means, this also contributes to lack of understanding.
65
66
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sure obligations. Sometimes healthcare providers may not obtain informed
consent to all interventions because doing so is simply not practicable. For example, patients may provide informed consent to a specific intervention but
never know about all the various procedures required to conduct that intervention or alternatives to these other procedures. 72 Providers may also perceive a
lack of time to engage in disclosure, or that disclosure is not necessary because
the intervention is commonplace. 73
Additionally, some providers may not understand the extent to which they
are not meeting their informed consent requirements. This misunderstanding
may stem from a lack of knowledge about their specific legal obligations. 74
Alternatively, providers who say they are committed to respecting patient autonomy may not be aware of how their interactions with their patients do not
accord with this commitment. 75 Scholars refer to the phenomenon of “providers us[ing] the language of informed consent” while acting paternalistic as
“performing informed consent.” 76
For some healthcare providers, failure to engage in meaningful informed
consent with their patients may be because providers view the requirement as a
mere formality required by law. Indeed, “some physicians have claimed that
they can almost always get their patients to consent to any procedure they de72
Entwistle et al., supra note 66, at 505 (describing necessity of “bundled” consent, or implied
consent to procedures necessary to conduct the procedure to which a patient has explicitly consented
(citing MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS (1997))).
73
King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 462, 473 (describing time and resource constraints (citing
Braddock et al., supra note 64, at 344)); Arwen H. Pieterse, Anne M. Stiggelbout & Victor M. Montori, Shared Decision Making and the Importance of Time, 322 JAMA 25, 25–26 (2019) (describing
time constraints in implementing shared decision making).
74
See Marc Tunzi, David J. Satin & Philip G. Day, The Consent Continuum: A New Model of
Consent, Assent, and Nondissent for Primary Care, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 2021, at 33, 34
(noting that physicians are unaware of when they need to obtain informed consent and tend only to do
so for invasive procedures like surgery rather than for more common interventions such as medication
or screening).
75
Providers either engage with their patients unilaterally or bilaterally; in the former instance,
“the practitioner talks in formats less conducive to patient’s participation,” consistent with physician
paternalism. Sarah Collins, Paul Drew, Ian Watt & Vikki Entwistle, “Unilateral” and “Bilateral”
Practitioner Approaches in Decision-Making about Treatment, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2611, 2625
(2005). In the latter instance, “the practitioner talks in a way which actively pursues patient’s contributions,” which is more consistent with shared decision making. Id.; see also stef m. shuster, Performing Informed Consent in Transgender Medicine, SOC. SCI. & MED., Apr. 2019, at 190, 195 (demonstrating that some providers begin the informed consent discussion using the word “we,” reflecting
joint decision making, but by the end used the word “I,” reflecting provider decision making.); Emily
S. Mann, The Power of Persuasion: Normative Accountability and Clinicians’ Practices of Contraceptive Counseling, SSM—QUALITATIVE RSCH. IN HEALTH, Dec. 2022, art. 100049, at 1, 4–6 (reporting that clinicians talk about the importance of patient autonomy, but in practice pressure patients
to accept the recommended intervention).
76
shuster, supra note 75, at 190–91, 195.
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sire to perform,” making patient choice an illusion the law creates. 77 Further,
some providers appear to view informed consent conversations and any associated documents primarily as a means to diminish potential liability.78 Patients
also perceive signing a consent form as a standard bureaucratic procedure
meant to protect doctors’ interests against any subsequent legal action, though
they may not feel like they have any choice but to sign it. 79
Finally, providers may not engage in legally-required informed consent
conversations with their patients because of their patients’ decision-making
preferences. That is, studies have shown that patient decision-making preferences may vary from the ideal informed consent process. 80 Namely, some patients “may not want to make [their own healthcare] decisions” and instead
wish to defer to their healthcare provider, and providers may adapt their communication accordingly.81 This decision-making preference may depend on the
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 155 (citing Henry K. Beecher, Consent in Clinical Experimentation: Myth and Reality, 195 JAMA 34, 34–35 (1966)). For information about how clinicians obtain
patient agreement even after an initial refusal, see Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Patients Who
Refuse Treatment in Medical Hospitals, 250 JAMA 1296, 1300 (1983); Jeffrey P. Spike, Informed
Consent is the Essence of Capacity Assessment, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 95, 98 (2017); Tanya Stivers
& Rose McCabe, Dueling in the Clinic: When Patients and Providers Disagree About Healthcare
Recommendations, SOC. SCI. & MED., Dec. 2021, art. 114140, at 1, 2; Tanya Stivers & Stefan Timmermans, Medical Authority Under Siege: How Clinicians Transform Patient Resistance into Acceptance, 61 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 60, 74 (2020); Merran Toerien, When Do Patients Exercise
Their Right to Refuse Treatment? A Conversation Analytic Study of Decision-Making Trajectories in
UK Neurology Outpatient Consultations, SOC. SCI. & MED., Dec. 2021, art. 114278, at 1, 2. Some
physicians may disclose information not to support patient choice but rather to enable treatment compliance. BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 148; KATZ, supra note 61, at 26.
78
shuster, supra note 75, at 194; Sinding et al., supra note 67, at 1097.
79
Doherty et al., supra note 67, at 216–17.
80
See BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 26–30, 84 (“[P]hysicians routinely underestimate the degree to
which patients would like to be informed . . . [and] overestimate patients’ eagerness to make decisions.”
(first citing Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL
MED. 163 (1984); then citing Louis Harris et. al., Views of Informed Consent and Decisionmaking: Parallel Surveys of Physicians and the Public, in 2 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBS. IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV. RSCH., MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP,
APPENDICES: EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF INFORMED CONSENT 17 (1982); and then citing Patients Opt for
Medical Information but Prefer Physician Decision Making, MEDICAL WORLD NEWS (Mar. 26, 1984)));
Moulton & King, supra note 62, at 89.
81
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 27; see Brach, supra note 71 (noting that patients would participate more in decision making if information was clearer); Doherty et al., supra note 67, at 213;
Moulton & King, supra note 62, at 89; Sinding et al., supra note 67, at 1097 (reporting that some
patients prefer to be fully informed and participate in decision making but want their physicians to
make the ultimate treatment decision given their medical expertise); A. Robinson & R. Thomson,
Variability in Patient Preferences for Participating in Medical Decision Making: Implication for the
Use of Decision Support Tools, 10 QUALITY HEALTH CARE (SUPP. I) i34, i37 (2001) (noting patients’
preference for treatment information even if they do not wish to decide). See generally Wendy Levinson, Audiey Kao, Alma Kuby & Ronald A. Thisted, Not All Patients Want to Participate in Decision
Making: A National Study of Public Preferences, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 531 (2005) (noting vari77
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patient’s goal of treatment. If being cured is possible, patients may defer to
their providers whereas if patients are at the end of their lives, they may feel
that they should make their own decisions. 82 Patients also may not wish to decide because they are sick and do not have the “emotional, intellectual, and
physical resources . . . to make decisions.” 83 Some scholars thus describe patients’ decisions as “not about treatment [but] rather . . . about [whether the
patient] trust[s]” their healthcare providers’ advice. 84
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the degree of agency patients
have in the healthcare encounter. Research has demonstrated that some
healthcare providers are paternalistic and make medical decisions on behalf of
their patients despite their patients’ decision-making preferences, which subverts patient self-determination in the clinical encounter. 85 Providers may do
this by framing or manipulating information in a manner meant to ensure patient authorization. 86 Providers may also add an informal capacity assessment
to the informed consent discussion, and if they view their patients as lacking
sufficient understanding or appreciation about an intervention—despite evidence of their patients’ normal cognitive functioning—the provider may deny
requested medical interventions even if otherwise medically indicated. 87 Or
providers may request a formal capacity assessment and after a finding of incapacity, override a treatment refusal. 88 In this manner, healthcare providers act

ation in decision-making preferences). Some providers may have problematic assumptions about their
patients’ ability or willingness to participate in healthcare decision making. See, e.g., Allen I. Goldberg, Life-Sustaining Technology and the Elderly: Prolonged Mechanical Ventilation Factors Influencing the Treatment Decision, 94 CHEST 1277, 1278–82 (1988) (reporting physicians’ views that
older patients cannot participate in medical decision making).
82
Sinding et al., supra note 67, at 1098.
83
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 28; see also Entwistle et al., supra note 66, at 506 (“There may
come a point at which the advantages of encouraging patients to engage in an explicit deliberative
decision-making process are outweighed by the cognitive and emotional burden on patients.”);
Schneider & Farrell, supra note 7, at 109.
84
Sinding et al., supra note 67, at 1096.
85
Collins et al., supra note 75, at 2625 (“Patients tended to say very little . . ., and what they did
say did not always appear to influence the selection of a particular course of action.”). Providers may
decide for their patients because they do not trust their patients to make good decisions. BERG ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 19; shuster, supra note 75, at 194. But see Stivers & McCabe, supra note 77, at 2
(describing patient power in clinical interactions); Stivers & Timmermans, supra note 77, at 74 (describing patient pressure on physicians during clinical interactions); Toerien, supra note 77, at 2 (noting that in the adult neurology treatment context, patient treatment refusals are sometimes honored).
86
See, e.g., Kukura, supra note 15, at 751 (describing such actions in the obstetric context). See
generally Mann, supra note 75 (describing same in the contraception context).
87
shuster, supra note 75, at 192–93. Providers may also provide nonconsensual treatment after an
informal capacity assessment. Marshall B. Kapp & Bernard Lo, Legal Perceptions and Medical Decision Making, 64 MILBANK Q. (SUPP. II) 163, 191–92 (1986).
88
See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
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as gatekeepers, and respect for patient autonomy becomes conditional on providers’ assessment of capacity for agency.
2. Proposed Reforms to Informed Consent Process
Scholars in many disciplines and professions have identified how the ideal of informed consent is not achieved in practice. 89 It is fair to say that
“[d]espite its name, ‘informed consent’ fails to assure that the patient’s consent
is actually informed” and “that relevant patient questions and concerns are adequately answered.” 90 Given that informed consent is illusory in practice,
scholars have advocated for reforms to promote physician disclosure and increase patient knowledge and understanding to ensure that patients receive
medical care that matches their preferences.
Namely, legal scholars and clinicians have promoted shared decision
making that is often paired with patient decision aids to supplement physician
oral disclosure. 91 Decision aids “include decision grids, videos, and interactive
websites” 92 and “brochures . . . computer programs, or third-party consultations,” and are often meant for use “outside [of] the clinical context” to assist
patients in choosing between different treatment options. 93 Evidence shows
several benefits of using decision aids, such as assisting patients in understanding their values and preferences, and recent legal scholarship has focused on
how to increase the use and ensure the quality of decision aids. 94
89
See, e.g., Pope, supra note 11, at 12 (“A giant chasm lies between the theory and the practice of
informed consent. . . . [I]t has failed to meaningfully empower patients to make . . . decisions that
match their preferences.”).
90
Id. at 17.
91
Id. at 29; Glyn Elwyn et al., Shared Decision Making: A Model for Clinical Practice, 27 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1361, 1365–66 (2012); King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 432, 464–68, 480
(arguing that informed consent law should build in shared decision-making requirements). But see
Blumenthal-Barby et al., supra note 62 passim (critiquing implementation of shared decision making
and patient decision aids).
92
Pope, supra note 11, at 13.
93
Sawicki, supra note 11, at 628–30. Decision aids “help patients understand the various treatment options available to them, including the risks and benefits of each choice”; “help patients communicate their beliefs and preferences related to their treatment options”; and “help patients decide
with their clinicians what treatments are best for them.” Pope, supra note 11, at 21; see Sawicki, supra
note 11, at 631–32.
94
King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 465. For description of additional benefits, see id. at 480–
86; Pope, supra note 11, at 21–22; Sawicki, supra note 11, at 629–33. Notwithstanding their benefits,
physicians do not widely use decision aids in clinical practice in part because “they reduce and constrain physician discretion and judgment.” Pope, supra note 11, at 21, 23. For a description of bias and
misinformation in existing decision aids, reasons for poor quality, and the necessity for certification to
“ensur[e] accurate and [complete] information,” see id. at 13, 25–29, Brach, supra note 71; King &
Moulton, supra note 11, at 466–67, 488–90; Sawicki, supra note 11, at 633–44, 658, 660, 661. For a
description of problems with the implementation of supported decision making and use of patient
decision aids, see generally Blumenthal-Barby et al., supra note 62.
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But ensuring patients understand their treatment options is not the only
remaining barrier to meeting the ideals of informed consent. 95 The failure of
informed consent is not solely a failure related to information and understanding. The scholarly focus on the “informed” element of informed consent may
elide failures with the legal requirement to obtain patient consent to medical
treatment. 96
C. Treatment Over Objection
Although there is an extensive body of empirical scholarship on physician
disclosures and patient understanding of medical interventions, there is relatively little research about nonconsensual medical treatment, specifically
treatment provided over patients’ express objection. 97 This is despite “a large
amount of anecdotal evidence . . . that significant medical interventions sometimes are imposed on patients in the absence of . . . informed consent. . . . [This
occurs] even when no valid exception to the requirement exists.” 98 The lack of
research is likely due to the reality that studying such unlawful behavior is incredibly difficult. 99
Though there are many accounts of treatment over objection in the mental
health context, legal scholarship about treatment over objection in the medical
context focuses on two primary circumstances: end-of-life decision making

And indeed, the focus on patient decision aids may not match patient decision-making preferences that might include having their healthcare providers decide on their behalf. See supra Section
I.B. Additionally, an excess of information can be harmful to the decision-making process. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, TOO MUCH INFORMATION: UNDERSTANDING WHAT YOU DON’T WANT TO
KNOW (2020) (arguing that too much and irrelevant information is often provided and that policymakers should instead provide more limited and useful information that will increase patient wellbeing).
96
Indeed, some clinicians have recently advocated for changing informed consent requirements
to fit clinical practice rather than changing clinical practice to fit legal doctrine, and in particular have
argued that in many instances patient assent or nondissent in the absence of currently-required physician disclosures is ethically sufficient. Tunzi et al., supra note 74, at 38–39.
97
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 235, 241; see also Kukura, supra note 15, at 778 (describing lack
of research on nonconsensual treatment during childbirth). There is some evidence of treatment over
patient objection found in court cases, but better data about nonconsensual treatment are in the psychiatric context. BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 235 (noting that conclusions derived from such data “are
not completely transferable to the general medical context”).
98
Marshall B. Kapp, Enforcing Patient Preferences: Linking Payment for Medical Care to Informed Consent, 261 JAMA 1935, 1935 (1989) (footnotes omitted) (first citing P.S. Appelbaum &
L.H. Roth, Involuntary Treatment in Medicine and Psychiatry, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 202 (1984);
and then citing Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 77).
99
Healthcare providers may be more open to participating in studies when they have at least attempted to engage in informed consent. They may be less likely to allow researchers access to
healthcare settings where researchers could observe clear violations of patient rights.
95

2022]

Resuscitating Consent

907

and obstetrics. This section will first describe these contexts before discussing
treatment over contemporaneous objection in general acute care settings.
1. Noncompliance with Advance Directives Refusing Treatment
There is ample evidence that physicians often do not follow their incapacitated patients’ advance directives to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 100 Indeed,
studies have shown that advance directives have no bearing on physicians’ decisions to resuscitate patients. 101 Disregarding such directives is an example of
treatment over objection, although the objection may not be contemporaneous. 102
There are several reasons that healthcare providers do not comply with
their patients’ advance directives and treat incapacitated patients over their objection. Some noncompliance may be unintentional; for example, providers
may not have access to or understand the advance directive. 103 Or there could
be “a lack of communication between providers and patients [or] inadequate
institutional documentation of patient wishes.” 104
Noncompliance with patient advance directives may also be intentional;
for example, providers may object to following the advance directive for reasons of conscience. 105 Providers may also think they are more likely to be sued
for wrongful death than medical battery—or have to pay larger damages in the
See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 117; Paula Span, The Patients Were Saved. That’s Why
the Families Are Suing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/health/
wrongful-life-lawsuit-dnr.html [https://perma.cc/D3T4-WHWT] (describing instances where healthcare
providers ignored advance directives refusing life-sustaining treatment).
101
Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 15, at 137 (citing Joan M. Teno et al., Do Formal Advance
Directives Affect Resuscitation Decisions and the Use of Resources for Seriously Ill Patients?, 5 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 23, 27 (1994)); see also David A. Asch, John Hansen-Flaschen & Paul N. Lanken,
Decisions to Limit or Continue Life-Sustaining Treatment by Critical Care Physicians in the United
States: Conflicts Between Physicians’ Practices and Patients’ Wishes, 151 AM. J. RESPIRATORY &
CRITICAL CARE MED. 288, 290–92 (1995) (reporting that many physicians would provide lifesustaining care over patient or surrogate objections, and almost all would make unilateral decisions
about “withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment” without consent or over the objection of
the lawful decision maker).
102
Providing life-sustaining treatment may not be unlawful if the circumstances that trigger the
operation of the advance directive have not occurred. Some states have stringent conditions for when
an advance directive is considered operative, and sometimes states restrict what types of medical care
can be refused via advance directive. Sawicki, supra note 15, at 287–88.
103
Id. at 283, 284 n.29 (citing studies and showing noncompliance); Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 15, at 137, 148 (noting that providers may not know their patient has an advance directive or
know how to interpret the directive).
104
Sawicki, supra note 15, at 302.
105
Id. at 284 n.29, 301–02. Physicians may also override DNR orders if the need for resuscitation
is due to an iatrogenic error because of guilt and also because of uncertainty about whether the DNR
order contemplated this type of situation. John Banja & Michele Sumler, Overriding Advance Directives: A 20-Year Legal and Ethical Overview, 39 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT., no. 2, 2019, at 11, 13.
100
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event of liability in the former instance—and thus choose to provide lifesustaining treatment despite the directive to forgo such treatment. 106 Finally,
providers may not comply with their patients’ advance directives because the
advance directives may appear to conflict with the patient’s current interests
and “many physicians not only consider it their responsibility to make treatment decisions in the best interest of the patient, but also believe that patient
preferences should be ignored when they are inconsistent with the physician’s
assessment.” 107
Given that such noncompliance defeats the purpose of advance directives
and also may be unlawful, many legal scholars have explored and advocated
for remedies in tort, administrative sanctions, and not billing patients for nonconsensual medical treatment. 108 Unfortunately, many courts have not vindicated patients’ right to refuse medical treatment via advance directive when
providers have overridden the directive, thus making this right illusory. 109
106
Banja & Sumler, supra note 105, at 15 (“[Physicians] would rather represent themselves in a
wrongful life suit than a wrongful death suit, and there have been no legal precedents to persuade
them otherwise.”); Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 15, at 149 (quoting a hospital administrator
who “stated starkly that she would ‘rather have a wrongful li[ving] claim than a wrongful death
claim’” (alteration in original)); Pope, New Penalties, supra note 15, at 74 (noting that providers do
not fear lawsuits for overriding patient advance directives (quoting INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., supra note 69, at 133)); Sawicki, supra note 15, at 284–86, 288–90, 301–02; see also ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS
145 (1979) (describing how physicians have “practical” rather than “formal” immunity when not held
to account for legal wrongs).
107
Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 15, at 156–57 (first citing Tricia Jonas Hackleman, Note,
Violation of an Individual’s Right to Die: The Need for a Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 64 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1355, 1357–58 (1996); and then citing David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53
MD. L. REV. 1255, 1283 (1994)); see also Pope, supra note 11, at 34 n.78 (“Substantial evidence
shows that the treatment patients get depends more on the physician than on the patient’s preferences.” (citing DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT, https://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ [https://perma.cc/
YLF4-C7LB]); Orentlicher, supra, at 1283 (“[L]iving wills . . . have little effect on medical decisionmaking. They will be respected only when they are consistent with the physician’s views of the
patient’s best interests.”); John J. Paris, J. Cameron Muir & Frank E. Reardon, Ethical and Legal
Issues in Intensive Care, 12 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 298, 299 (1997) (reporting that a majority of
physicians believe that preserving life is more important than respecting patient autonomy and that
“physicians . . . continue to function independently of the preferences of critically ill patients”). Providers may also acquiesce to “objections by family members to the patient’s preferred course of
treatment.” Sawicki, supra note 15, at 302.
108
Scholars have argued that providers who are noncompliant with patient advance directives
should be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages, not receive reimbursement for nonconsensual medical services, be subject to professional sanctions, be fined by
CMS, and possibly be subject to criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note
15, at 148, 170, 172–77; Pope, New Penalties, supra note 15, at 75, 80; Sawicki, supra note 15, at
292–93; Mark Strasser, A Jurisprudence in Disarray: On Battery, Wrongful Living, and the Right to
Bodily Integrity, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 997, 1034, 1036–38, 1039–40 (1999).
109
See Banja & Sumler, supra note 105, at 15 (“[N]o court to date has awarded damages to plaintiffs for the defendant’s specific autonomy violation of providing life-prolonging interventions despite
the patient’s refusal . . . .” (citing Nicole Marie Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., What Are the Conse-
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Noncompliance with patient advance directives is undoubtedly an important issue, but scholarship and law reform proposals on this topic do not
address the situation where a capacitated patient is contemporaneously refusing medical treatment and the provider is treating over their objection. 110
2. Nonconsensual Obstetric Interventions
Nonconsensual gynecological and obstetric interventions are not uncommon. First, there is the issue of nonconsensual sterilization, a practice that has
been embedded in past institutional policies targeting marginalized women and
that is currently alleged to be occurring in migrant detention camps. 111 Second,
there is an emerging literature about nonconsensual gynecological exams to
train medical students, residents, and fellows; such examinations usually occur
when a woman patient is under general anesthesia for a (perhaps) unrelated
medical procedure, is not informed about the examination, and thus does not
consent to it. 112
Legal scholars have also written about obstetric violence, which includes
nonconsensual medical treatment. 113 There are many documented instances in
quences of Disregarding a “Do Not Resuscitate Directive” in the United States?, 32 MED. & L. 441
(2013))); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to
Refuse Medical Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1039–40 (1998). Some of the difficulty
for plaintiffs is in proving causation. Strasser, supra note 108, at 1035–38. Additionally, courts may
not consider continued life to be a harm. Id. at 1032–36; see Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 15, at
142–48; Sawicki, supra note 15, at 284–86, 288–90. Courts may also have difficulty calculating damages, although the damages are relatively straightforward and include costs of nonconsensual medical
treatment, physical harm from the treatment, pain and suffering, and perhaps punitive damages.
Strasser, supra note 108, at 1021–38.
110
Noncompliance with advance directives is also only an issue for patients who have advance
directives; such patients constitute a minority of all patients. Kuldeep N. Yadav et al., Approximately
One in Three US Adults Completes Any Type of Advance Directive for End-of-Life Care, 36 HEALTH
AFFS. 1244, 1247–48 (2017).
111
See generally Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding that forced sterilization of persons with
mental disabilities did not violate the Due Process Clause); HARRY BRUINIUS, BETTER FOR ALL THE
WORLD: THE SECRET HISTORY OF FORCED STERILIZATION AND AMERICA’S QUEST FOR RACIAL PURITY (2006) (recounting the history of forced eugenics); HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2006) (describing how Black women who were enslaved were the objects of
medical experimentation); ICE, A Whistleblower and Forced Sterilization, NPR (Sept. 22, 2020), https://
www.npr.org/2020/09/18/914465793/ice-a-whistleblower-and-forced-sterilization [https://perma.cc/3AZMR6AA] (discussing allegations of forced sterilization of detained women immigrants).
112
See, e.g., Emma Goldberg, She Didn’t Want a Pelvic Exam. She Received One Anyway., N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/health/pelvic-medical-exam-unconscious.html [https://
perma.cc/SB2S-YG2V] (Feb. 19, 2020).
113
See Kukura, supra 15, at 736, 778 (defining obstetric violence as abuse, coercion, disrespect,
use of physical restraints, sexual violations, and punitive denial of pain relief); see also Pope, Unwanted Cesareans, supra note 15, at 164 (adding confidentiality breaches to definition of obstetric
violence). For a description of birth trauma as a concept distinct from obstetric violence, see Theresa
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which pregnant women receive medical interventions to which they have not
consented and sometimes to which they have actively objected, despite the fact
that these women are competent to make their own healthcare decisions and
are legally entitled to do so. 114 Healthcare providers may coerce their patients
into agreeing to procedures in a number of ways: threatening to involve the
state by seeking a court order or reporting the woman to child welfare, questioning their patient’s capacity to make medical decisions, manipulating information they provide to their patient (for example, by emphasizing risks of no
treatment and overestimating benefits of intervention), and denying pain relief
or other medical treatment when patients resist their recommendations. 115
The culture and structure of medicine together with gender norms produce the conditions for obstetric violence. 116 Some women are more vulnerable
to obstetric violence, such as young women, low-income women, and women

Morris, Joan H. Robinson, Keridwyn Spiller & Amanda Gomez, “Screaming, ‘No! No!’ It Was Literally Like Being Raped”: Connecting Sexual Assault Trauma and Coerced Obstetric Procedures, SOC.
PROBS. (SUPP.), July 20, 2021, at 1, 2, https://academic.oup.com/socpro/advance-article/doi/10.1093/
socpro/spab024/6324470 [https://perma.cc/HEB9-3X2U].
114
See, e.g., Kukura, supra note 15, at 759 (citing studies demonstrating that the majority of episiotomies are nonconsensual and describing a study where birth workers directly observed physicians
“conduct a procedure over a woman’s explicit objections” (citing LOUISE MARIE ROTH ET AL., MATERNITY SUPPORT SURVEY: A REPORT ON THE CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY OF DOULAS, CHILDBIRTH
EDUCATORS AND LABOR AND DELIVERY NURSES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 37 (2014),
https://maternitysurvey.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/mss-report-5-1-14-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ULT3-GPZY])); Morris et al., supra note 113, at 7–9 (describing use of force against women during
childbirth); Hindi Stohl, Childbirth Is Not a Medical Emergency: Maternal Right to Informed Consent
Throughout Labor and Delivery, 38 J. LEGAL MED. 329, 343–47 (2018) (arguing that outside of exceptional circumstances, the emergency exception to the informed consent requirements cannot be
relied upon during childbirth). For interventions such as cesareans, women may authorize the procedure, but experience significant pressure to do so, making the “consent” not voluntary. Kukura, supra
note 15, at 759. Scholars have asserted that instances of obstetric violence alleged in court cases “are
only the tip of a deep iceberg of other cases that exist ‘below the surface,’ never filed.” Pope, Unwanted Cesareans, supra note 15, at 170; see also Morris et al., supra note 113, at 11 (noting cases of
obstetric violence where victims did not take legal action). Other types of treatment over a pregnant
patient’s objection include life-sustaining treatment, refused contemporaneously or via advance directive or surrogate. Kukura, supra note 15, at 739 & n.100 (citing In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237
(D.C. 1990)). Courts, however, have not always affirmed pregnant patients’ medical decision-making
rights. See BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 228 (citing Lawrence J. Nelson & Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Life, Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 JAMA 1060,
1066 (1988)); Kukura, supra note 15, at 738–43; Pope, Unwanted Cesareans, supra note 15, at 164.
115
See Kukura, supra note 15, at 738–54; see also Pope, Unwanted Cesareans, supra note 15, at
166 (noting that physicians may also demean the woman).
116
Scholars highlight reimbursement models, malpractice concerns, the culture of physician paternalism, the “medicalization of childbirth,” the routinization of medical interventions, and gender
norms as explanations for obstetric violence. Kukura, supra note 15, at 765–78; Morris et al., supra
note 113, at 2.
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of color. 117 Women may experience adverse emotional, psychological, and
physical outcomes when treated without consent. 118
Treating pregnant women over their objection occurs in a somewhat
unique medical context in which there may be concerns about the fetus and
many of the legal considerations—such as reproductive rights jurisprudence—
and ethical considerations in providing such treatment do not apply to other
type of patients or medical situations. 119
3. Other Contexts
There are no systematic studies of patient treatment refusal and subsequent treatment over contemporaneous objection for patients with or without
decisional capacity, although such treatment is not uncommon. 120 This section
See Kukura, supra note 15, at 750. See generally Mann, supra note 75 (describing how clinicians pressure low-income women to use long-acting contraception).
118
Some women even experience post-traumatic stress after enduring coercion in the obstetric
context. Kukura, supra note 15, at 760 (describing studies); Morris et al., supra note 113, at 8–9.
119
Kukura, supra note 15, at 777 (describing how in cases of patient-provider disagreement, physicians may assert that there is a “maternal-fetal conflict” that necessitates privileging what the physician perceives to be in the interest of the fetus, which “directly coincide with his own personal treatment preferences” (quoting Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV.451, 454 (2000))); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 590–603 (2011) (discussing how women’s autonomy is
limited by others’ concern for “fetal interests”); Morris et al., supra note 113, at 2 (describing focus on
“healthy baby” and fetal safety); Terri-Ann Samuels et al., Obstetricians, Health Attorneys, and
Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections, 17 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 107, 109–11 (2007) (reporting results of a survey of obstetricians and health lawyers, over half of whom support court-ordered cesareans for pregnant women who refuse the procedure).
120
Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 77, at 1299 (“Forced treatment, which was not uncommon,
was usually limited to patients who were incompetent to make decisions about medical treatment
. . . .”); Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 98, at 202 (“[N]onconsensual treatment in general medicine is,
in fact, quite common . . . .”); see, e.g., Frank W. Lavoie, Consent, Involuntary Treatment, and the
Use of Force in an Urban Emergency Department, ANNALS EMERGENCY MED., Jan. 1992, at 25, 27
(“Epidemiologic investigations of involuntary treatment in a general hospital ED have never been
performed . . . .”). Small studies reported in the literature indicate that treatment over contemporaneous objection, even when patients have decisional capacity, is “not uncommon.” See, e.g., Appelbaum
& Roth, supra note 77, at 1299 & tbl.4; Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 98, at 202; Lavoie, supra, at
25–26, 26 tbl.1 (reporting that hospital security personnel used force, including seclusion and restraints, on almost 9% of emergency department patients, even if no one had evaluated the patient’s
capacity to make their own medical decisions). Further, given the documented problems with capacity
assessments, it can be inferred that in some instances where a patient has been deemed incompetent to
make their own decisions, they are in fact competent and thus being unlawfully treated over their
objections. See discussion supra Section I.A.2. Additionally, leading clinical ethics textbooks argue
for treating competent patients over their objection in some instances, and if this guidance is followed,
this would lead to treatment over objection in practice. See ALBERT R. JONSEN, MARK SIEGLER &
WILLIAM J. WINSLADE, CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISIONS IN
CLINICAL MEDICINE §§ 1.0.8, 2.2.4 (8th ed. 2015). Court cases also shed light on how competent
117
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draws on smaller studies to survey reasons patients refuse treatment and patient
experiences of being treated over their objection before examining why providers treat patients over their contemporaneous objection in acute care settings.
a. Patient Reasons for Refusing Treatment and Experiences Being Treated
Over Objection
There are manifold reasons why patients may refuse medical treatment.
Some treatment refusals may not be rational. Indeed, some scholars assert that
patients who refuse treatment may not be well-informed. 121 Patients may not
be informed because physicians have not engaged in adequate disclosure, ensured patient understanding, or elicited what is important to their patient. 122 It
may also be that the treatment refusal does not reflect the patient’s values and
is instead a result of psychopathology. 123
But patients may refuse treatment, including life-sustaining treatment, for
what could be considered rational reasons. For example, in one study of older
cancer patients’ decisions to refuse treatment, researchers found that many
were concerned about side effects, did not believe the recommended treatment
would be beneficial, thought the treatment would be too risky given their
preexisting medical conditions, were considering quality of life, had financial
concerns, or did not want to burden others, among other reasons. 124
patients may be treated over their contemporaneous objection. See, e.g., Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d
58, 60–61 (Mass. 1999) (alleging forcible intubation over competent adult patient’s contemporaneous
objection, requiring use of security guards and four-point restraints, which subsequently caused emotional trauma and reluctance to seek future medical treatment, eventually leading to preventable death
from asthma); Hinkle v. Kindred Hosp., No. M2010-02499-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3799215, at *1–3
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2012) (alleging that a nurse forcefully inserted a rectal tube over competent
adult patient’s contemporaneous objection, which caused physical injury, pain, subsequent surgeries
to repair injury, and permanent incontinence).
121
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 242.
122
See id. at 235 (summarizing studies about uninformed refusals); Appelbaum & Roth, supra
note 77, at 1298 & tbl.3 (noting that refusals may be due to [p]roblems in communication”). The
structure of healthcare may also contribute to lack of informed refusals as patients often interact with
multiple healthcare providers, each spending a limited time with patients. BERG ET AL., supra note 3,
at 235–36.
123
See, e.g., Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 77, at 1298 (noting that refusals may be due to psychological factors); Rebecca O’Brien et al., When People Living with Dementia Say “No”: Negotiating Refusal in the Acute Hospital Setting, SOC. SCI. & MED., Oct. 2020, art. 113188, at 1, 3–7 (2020)
(reporting that refusals of care, including medical treatment, in the hospital are common for dementia
patients). But see BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 236–43 (“[R]efusal is only rarely a manifestation of
psychiatric illness, and . . . psychiatric illness in itself is not sufficient to render patients incompetent.”).
124
Martine T.E. Puts et al., A Systematic Review of Factors Influencing Older Adults’ Decision to
Accept or Decline Cancer Treatment, 41 CANCER TREATMENT REVS. 197, 199–204, 205 tbl.4, 210
tbl.5, 213 tbl.6 (2015). Some patients reported having communication and trust issues with their
healthcare providers as well as poor experiences in prior treatment. Id. Many patients, however, did
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Whatever the reason for treatment refusal, when providers override a patient’s objection, the patient may need to be physically restrained in order to
provide the medical treatment. Patients’ experience of being physically restrained is overwhelmingly negative. In a review of studies of such experiences, patients report feeling “anger, fear, humiliation, demoralization, dehumanization, degradation, powerlessness, distress, embarrassment, and feeling that
their integrity as a person had been violated.” 125 Patients report feeling “helpless, hopeless, and as if their spirits had been broken at some point during their
restraint experience.” 126 The negative effects on psychological and emotional
wellbeing are more intense if the medical intervention “permanently alters
bodily appearance and function.” 127 Aside from psychological and emotional
trauma from being restrained, patients may also be physically harmed when
treated over their objection. 128 Patients also may lose trust in their healthcare
providers and thus not seek medical treatment in the future, which can lead to

agree to treatment. Id. at 212; see also Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 77, at 1298 tbl.3 (noting that
refusals also may be due to insufficient trust in providers or concerns about dying with dignity); Toerien, supra note 77, at 17 (describing symptom management reasons for treatment refusals).
125
Tania D. Strout, Perspectives on the Experience of Being Physically Restrained: An Integrative Review of the Qualitative Literature, 19 INT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 416, 423 (2010)
(first citing G. Bonner, T. Lowe, D. Rawcliffe & N Wellman, Trauma for All: A Pilot Study of the
Subjective Experience of Physical Restraint for Mental Health Inpatients and Staff in the UK, 9 J.
PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 465 (2002); then citing Wai-Tong Chien, Carmen W.H.
Chan, Lai-Wah Lam & C.-W. Kam, Psychiatric Inpatients’ Perceptions of Positive and Negative
Aspects of Physical Restraint, 59 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 80 (2005); then citing Ruth Gallop,
Elizabeth McCay, Maya Guha & Pamela Khan, The Experience of Hospitalization and Restraint of
Women Who Have a History of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 20 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 401
(2010); then citing Mary E. Johnson, Being Restrained: A Study of Power and Powerlessness, 19
ISSUES MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 191 (1998); then citing Peter Jones & Biza Stenfert Kroese, Service Users’ Views of Physical Restraint Procedures in Secure Settings for People with Learning Disabilities, 35 BRIT. J. LEARNING DISABILITIES 50 (2006); then citing Heather Sequeira & Simon
Halstead, “Is It Meant to Hurt, Is It?”: Management of Violence in Women with Developmental Disabilities, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 462 (2001); then citing N.E. Strumpf & L.K. Evans, Physical
Restraint of the Hospitalized Elderly: Perceptions of Patients and Nurses, 37 NURSING RSCH. 132
(1988); then citing Ivy SL Wong & Wai-Tong Chien, Young Medical Patients’ Experience of Physical
Restraint: An Exploratory Study, 14 J. CLINICAL NURSING 120 (2005); and then citing Rolf Wynn,
Psychiatric Inpatients’ Experiences with Restraint, 15 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCH. 124
(2004)). Physical restraints also caused some patients to become more agitated. Id.
126
Id. at 424.
127
Jonah Rubin & Kenneth M. Prager, Commentary, Guide to Considering Nonpsychiatric Medical Intervention Over Objection for the Patient Without Decisional Capacity, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC.
826, 827 (2018).
128
See, e.g., Hinkle v. Kindred Hosp., No. M2010-02499-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3799215, at
*1–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2012) (alleging ruptured bowel and permanent incontinence from forcible insertion of rectal tube); Debbie Tolson & John E. Morley, Physical Restraints: Abusive and
Harmful, 13 JAMDA 311, 311–12 (2012) (describing harms from restraints).

914

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 63:887

further physical harm. 129 Given that patients may have good reasons to refuse
treatment, and given the profoundly negative experience of forcible, involuntary treatment, it is important to determine why providers treat patients over
their objection.
b. Provider Reasons for Treating Patients Over Objection
There are many reasons why healthcare providers may treat patients over
their objection in the face of an express, contemporaneous treatment refusal.
For example, patient rejection of treatment conflicts with a physician’s professional identity and training to heal, especially if the treatment would prolong
life or prevent disability, thereby possibly causing the physician to feel upset
when treatment is refused. 130 Healthcare providers may also provide nonconsensual treatment because it will be reimbursed by health insurers if determined to be medically necessary or because so doing is convenient for them. 131
The relative difficulty of treating patients over their contemporaneous objection may be a dispositive factor in some cases. Indeed, treatment over patient objection may require force or incapacitation through use of physical restraints, sedation, or security guards or nurses holding down an activelyresisting patient. 132 Treatments that need to be administered over a lengthy period of time require patient compliance. 133
129
Rubin & Prager, supra note 127, at 827; see, e.g., Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58, 60–61 (Mass.
1999) (alleging patient did not seek treatment for an asthma attack because she had been forcibly
treated over her objection in the past, leading to her preventable death).
130
See BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 227, 233, 234; Barry R. Furrow, Bouvia v. Superior Court, in
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: HEALTH LAW OPINIONS REWRITTEN (Seema Mohapatra & Lindsay Wiley
eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 10) (on file with author) (noting that patients who do “not conform
to the norms of usual patient behavior” by refusing treatment may anger physicians who find them
“difficult”); Kukura, supra note 15, at 771–72 (linking nonconsensual treatment in the obstretric context to “defensive medicine”); Navin et al., supra note 20, at 1938.
131
See Kapp, supra note 98, at 1936; see also Kukura, supra note 15, at 743 (suggesting that cesarean sections may be forced on women because this procedure generates more revenue for providers
compared to vaginal deliveries); David Evans & Mary FitzGerald, Reasons for Physically Restraining
Patients and Residents: A Systematic Review and Content Analysis, 39 INT’L J. NURSING STUD. 735,
741 (2002) (describing how most uses of restraints are to benefit providers and facilities rather than
patients).
132
Lavoie, supra note 120, at 26–27 (describing how a hospital employs “security personnel to
assist” healthcare providers in treating patients over their objection); Appelbaum & Roth, supra note
77, at 1299–1300 (describing use of restraints and conscription of family members to treat patients
over their objection); Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 98, at 203 (describing use of physical restraints
in hospital and surgical wards).
133
See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 81, at 1280; Rubin & Prager, supra note 127, at 827 (“Even
with strong ethical justification for treating over objection, it is often impossible due to logistical obstacles. Examples include forcing a patient with kidney failure to undergo dialysis repeatedly or compelling a patient with AIDS to take medication regularly.”).
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Providers may also be ignorant about the law and purpose of informed
consent. 134 They may believe, for example, that they are less at risk for medical
malpractice for treating patients over objection than they are for not providing
a potentially life-sustaining treatment. 135 Physicians may also provide treatment over their patient’s objection if they feel the patient is not competent to
make their own medical decisions or if the treatment is in their patient’s best
medical interests. 136
Healthcare providers may justify treatment over contemporaneous objection by relying on the exceptions to informed consent, namely the intersection of emergency and incapacity exceptions. In order to justify this action, providers may request capacity assessments from psychiatrists to dis-

Healthcare providers are often ignorant of the law that governs patient-provider relationships.
For example, many healthcare providers do not understand that patients can choose to leave the hospital against medical advice without forfeiting future rights to care. See generally Cordelia R. Stearns,
Allison Bakamjian, Subrina Sattar & Miranda Ritterman Weintraub, Discharges Against Medical
Advice at a County Hospital: Provider Perceptions and Practice, 12 J. HOSP. MED. 11 (2017) (describing characteristics of patients who leave hospitals against medical advice and noting provider
misconceptions about patients’ rights to care); David Alfandre, Editorial, Improving Quality in
Against Medical Advice Discharges—More Empirical Evidence, Enhanced Professional Education,
and Directed Systems Changes, 12 J. HOSP. MED. 59 (2017) (highlighting characteristics of patients
who are discharged against medical advice and provider lack of understanding about patients’ rights to
leave and still access care in the future). Healthcare providers are also often ignorant of their legal
obligations to their patients with disabilities. Nicole D. Agaronnik et al., Knowledge of Practicing
Physicians About Their Legal Obligations When Caring for Patients with Disability, 38 HEALTH
AFFS. 545, 546, 548–49 (2019).
135
See BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 52, 124; Kapp, supra note 98, at 1935; Kapp & Lo, supra
note 87, at 191; Kukura, supra note 15, at 738, 771–72, 774.
136
See, e.g., Lawrence & Curlin, supra note 59, at 216 & tbl.2 (reporting that only 40% of physicians believe patient autonomy was the most important consideration in ethically complex situations
and that other factors included patients’ best medical interests, medical society guidance, and the
providers’ religious beliefs); BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 52 (suggesting that nonconsensual treatment may occur because of “physicians’ reluctance to allow even competent patients to refuse medically indicated treatment” (citing Lawrence J. Markson, Donald C. Kern, George J. Annas & Leonard
H. Glantz, Physician Assessment of Patient Competence, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1074 (1994)));
van Kleffens & van Leeuwen, supra note 14, at 133–35 (describing how providers view rationality in
terms of medical reasoning and assess rationality with respect to treatment goals rather than values).
Though physicians may see conflict between their duties to support patient autonomy and promote
patient wellbeing, this view may be mistaken. van Kleffens & van Leeuwen, supra note 14, at 135. In
some cases, there may not be a “best” treatment, and so a patient’s choice to refuse the recommended
treatment is not “wrong,” just based on their personal preference; additionally, the patient may have
more insight into the effects of the recommended treatment than the physician if the patient has previous experience with the particular treatment. BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 233–34; see also Walter
Veit, Brian D. Earp, Heather Browning & Julian Savulescu, Evaluating Tradeoffs Between Autonomy
and Wellbeing in Supported Decision Making, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct. 2021, at 21, 22 (arguing that
providers should not assume that persons with cognitive impairments will have a decline in wellbeing
if permitted to make their own decisions).
134
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qualify their patient from making their own treatment decisions. 137 Providers may also try to pressure the psychiatrist to determine a patient to be incapacitated despite evidence to the contrary. 138 A finding of incapacity permits healthcare providers to seek consent from a surrogate decision maker. 139 Providers may also consult with hospital attorneys or ethics committees to sign off on the treatment over objection. 140
****
Scholars tend to discuss the history of informed consent doctrine and
medical practice as evolving to become more protective of patient autonomy. 141 By contrast, this last Section has shown that even the basic requirement
to obtain patient authorization to treatment is not met in some circumstances.
There needs to be more research on the “consent” part of informed consent in
the context of treatment over contemporaneous patient objection, especially
when the law does not permit such treatment.
The scholarly focus on information disclosures and patient understanding
may obscure the reality that healthcare providers may resist informed consent
not so much because they are required to inform patients, but more so because
they may not believe patients should be able to make their own medical decisions, especially decisions refusing treatment. 142
137
See, e.g., Andrew H. Mebane & Harry B. Rauch, When Do Physicians Request Competency
Evaluations?, 31 PSYCHOSOMATICS 40, 41–42, 44–45 (1990) (reporting that urgent psychiatric consults were requested when patients refused medical interventions and asserting that the consults are
motivated by provider frustration rather than concern for patients); Spike, supra note 77, at 100 (arguing that capacity assessments are overused and that better communication is the solution); Umapathy
et al., supra note 53, at 29–32 (reporting that over 20% of hospital psychiatric consultation requests
over a one-month period involved treatment refusal cases); see also Kukura, supra note 15, at 748
(describing psychiatric consultations in obstetric context).
138
See, e.g., Mark Katz, Susan Abbey, Anne Rydall & Frederick Lowy, Psychiatric Consultation
for Competency to Refuse Medical Treatment: A Retrospective Study of Patient Characteristics and
Outcome, 36 PSYCHOSOMATICS 33, 39 (1995) (“Urgent consultations and those where a more serious
treatment is refused put increased pressure on the consulting psychiatrist to quickly decide and support the medical team’s wish for intervention by declaring the patient incompetent.”); Umapathy et al.,
supra note 53, at 28–29 (describing an “‘unspoken but clear expectation’ on the part of the treatment
team . . . that the patient will be found incompetent so that treatment can proceed” (quoting Katz et al.,
supra, at 34)).
139
See, e.g., UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994).
140
For advice to seek legal or ethics counsel in cases of treatment over objection and descriptions
of subsequent problematic advice, see Goldberg, supra note 81, at 1280; Kukura, supra note 15, at
730; Lavoie, supra note 120, at 38. But see Navin et al., supra note 20, at 1938 (suggesting that “it
seems likely that . . . institutional ethics permission . . . can contribute to complacency about the ethics
of treatment over objection”).
141
See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 20 n.2 (“Another important conceptual shift focuses on
the understanding of autonomy, from mere freedom from uninvited interference with one’s body, to
an opportunity to express one’s values and preferences.”) (emphasis added).
142
Id. at 240.
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II. PATIENTS SHOULD NOT BE TREATED OVER THEIR OBJECTION
The scholarly neglect of consent is problematic for many reasons. First,
focusing on information and understanding promotes a conceptualization of
autonomy as essentially cognitive in nature; that is, understanding autonomy to
be equivalent to rationality, eliding the embodied nature of autonomy and patients’ interests in maintaining bodily integrity. Indeed, when healthcare providers treat conscious patients without consent, particularly over their explicit
and contemporaneous refusal, patients may suffer physical, emotional, or psychological trauma.
Additionally, conceptualizing autonomy as rationality results in the transfer of power from patients to clinicians who can “disqualify” patients from
medical decision making and treat patients over their objection. The use of capacity assessments to investigate patients’ decisions is an affront to patient privacy. This practice also conflicts with developments in disability law that aim
to help individuals retain decision-making authority in their lives regardless of
whether they have decisional impairments.
Finally, there are rule of law implications when providers treat patients
over their objection. When providers ignore the law of informed consent, they
contribute to the erosion of the rule of private law.
Section A of this Part will focus first on how treating patients over their
objection is inconsistent with respect for autonomy and bodily integrity. 143 Section B will then focus on how treating patients over their objection contributes to
a decline in overall welfare. 144 Finally, Section C will conclude by discussing
how treating patients over their objection is inconsistent with the rule of law. 145
A. Treating Patients Over Their Objection Is Inconsistent with Respect
for Patient Autonomy and Bodily Integrity
Scholars have identified two different conceptualizations of autonomy
that healthcare decision-making law recognizes. The first conceptualization of
autonomy is as “bodily integrity . . . rooted in the historic, common law right
to be free from non-consensual bodily touching or invasion,” which is the conceptualization upon which the doctrine of informed consent is historically anchored. 146 Consent to touching the body maintains the integrity of the physical
body and allows the medical intervention to be lawful. 147 Refusal of the touchSee infra notes 146–192 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 193–207 and accompanying text.
145
See infra notes 208–223 and accompanying text.
146
Anne Flamme & Heidi Forster, Legal Limits: When Does Autonomy in Health Care Prevail?,
in 3 LAW AND MEDICINE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at 141, 142.
147
Id.
143
144
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ing makes any medical treatment provided an invasion of the body and potentially unlawful. 148 The more recent conceptualization of autonomy in informed
consent law is as self-determination, based on rights to privacy or liberty interests, and moves from protecting the body to making decisions about the
body. 149
Choosing a particular legal conceptualization of autonomy to emphasize
in the doctrine and practice of informed consent has implications for the significance of patient capacity for rational decision making. Maintenance of bodily
integrity, the first doctrinal understanding of autonomy in healthcare decisionmaking law, does not contain a patient rationality requirement. 150 Selfdetermination, the second conceptualization of autonomy, hints at a minimum
rationality requirement. This Section will argue for deemphasizing rationality
and emphasizing bodily integrity in the context of treatment refusals, but also
that regardless of how autonomy is conceptualized in informed consent law, it
is not respectful of autonomy to treat patients over their objection. 151
1. Deemphasizing Decisional Capacity and Rationality
For many healthcare providers, clinical ethicists, and lawyers, patient autonomy has become conflated with a patient’s capacity for and subsequent
commitment to rational choice as judged by healthcare providers.152 Conflating
Id. Even if the nonconsensual touching falls under an exception to the requirement to obtain
informed consent, thus making the nonconsensual touching lawful, it is still an invasion and violation
of bodily integrity. See id.; William Lucy, The Rule of Law and Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND
THE RULE OF LAW 41, 62–64 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014).
148

The scheme of rights and entitlements embodied in private law constitutes a prima facie
hurdle, which must be surmounted through legal means or brazenly discarded, to the
exercise of such force. And even when that hurdle is overcome, the overcoming remains either regrettable (as when such rights and entitlements are legally overridden) or
plain wrong (when there is no such legal licence).
Lucy, supra, at 62.
149
Flamme & Forster, supra note 146, at 142–43. Both conceptualizations of autonomy—
maintenance of bodily integrity and self-determination—are found in ACOG’s opinion about informed consent. See ACOG Opinion No. 819, supra note 59, at e35. But this seems to be medical
specialty-specific, and the bodily integrity component of informed consent is not present in the AMA
opinions.
150
Herring & Wall, supra note 24, at 583 (asserting that bodily integrity interests remain despite
the loss of decisional capacity).
151
This Article does not argue that there is no cognitive component of autonomy and also does
not argue that physicians should not be required to disclose information to their patients about risks
and benefits of various treatment options. See infra notes 152–174 and accompanying text.
152
There is direct evidence of this conflation in many scholarly writings. See, e.g., Annas, supra
note 5, at 11 (arguing “to reform our practice to make sure that informed choice actually . . . promotes
rational decision-making, and protects self-determination”); BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 146 (describing an aim of informed consent as “promoting rational decisionmaking” (quoting Protection of
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autonomy with rationality allows physicians to retain power over medical decision making. If the patient’s reaction to the physician’s judgment is one of
compliance, then the patient’s decisional capacity is not in question. 153 If the
patient disagrees with the physician, however, the physician can always try to
discredit the patient through use of a capacity assessment. A finding of incapacity removes decision-making power from their patient and then allows the
physician to turn to a surrogate decision maker or a healthcare power of attorney to authorize a particular treatment. 154 Equating autonomy with rationality
based on medical reasoning permits healthcare providers to substitute their
own judgment for that of their patients. 155
Healthcare decision-making law has facilitated the removal of decisionmaking authority from patients as legislators and judges have largely ceded
authority to determine patient decisional capacity to healthcare providers, supporting the notion of autonomy as capacity to make rational medical decisions.
Healthcare providers’ determination of a patient’s incapacity to make medical
decisions results in a stripping of legal capacity to decide. Therefore, although

Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498, 51,500 (Oct. 2, 1996) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56, 312, 314, 601, 812, 814))); Thomas et al., supra note 63, at 2 (noting that shared
decision-making models emphasize rationality). The clinical practice of using capacity assessments to
remove decision-making authority from patients also demonstrates an understanding of autonomy as
capacity for rationality.
153
See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 103–04; KATZ, supra note 61, at 113; Ganzini et al.,
supra note 51, at 239 tbl.1, 241; Mebane & Rauch, supra note 137, at 45 (describing how capacity
assessments are requested in cases of treatment refusal but not acceptance).
154
See BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 103–04; Jason Adam Wasserman & Mark Christopher
Navin, Capacity for Preferences: Respecting Patients with Compromised Decision-Making, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June 2018, at 31, 37 (“[N]oncompliant patients are disproportionately determined to lack decision-making capacity . . . .” (citing Ganzini et al., supra note 51)).
155
If patients do not share the same background understanding of their condition as physicians,
then when physicians engage in a standardized informed consent process, physicians may deem their
patient’s decision to be irrational and thus unworthy of legal or moral respect. See BERG ET AL., supra
note 3, at 313–14; van Kleffens & van Leeuwen, supra note 14, at 133–35 (noting that physicians
understand rationality in terms of goals of medical treatment). But it is important to note that patients
who are making rational treatment decisions may not be using a medical logic; they may be making
decisions in light of finances, relationships, emotions, religion, or other nonmedical concerns important to their wellbeing. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 61, at 76, 96, 117 (noting that longevity is not
the only valid consideration in medical decision making and arguing that physicians’ value judgments
are incorporated into a determination of medical best interests); Brach, supra note 71 (arguing for
price transparency as part of the informed consent process); see also Puts et al., supra note 124, at
205–13; Sinding et al., supra note 67, at 1095; Stearns et al., supra note 134, at 15; van Kleffens &
van Leeuwen, supra note 14, at 133–35 (noting that patients may be making rational decisions on the
basis of their values).
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respect for patient autonomy is the premise of both healthcare decision-making
law and medical ethics, physician paternalism remains prevalent. 156
Why have physicians been granted so much (quasi-legal) power? Arguably, efficiency concerns support this grant of power: patients may need urgent
or emergency medical care, physicians have the tools to assess decisional capacity, and courts may be unable to handle significant numbers of requests to
determine capacity.
There is also another explanation: some scholars have advanced the concept of “informed refusals,” thought to be the corollary of informed consent—
that treatment refusals must also be informed. 157 This opens the patient’s reasons for refusal up to scrutiny, which is an investigation of whether the refusal
is “informed,” along with the possibility that a treatment refusal will not be
respected due to the incapacity exception to informed consent. 158
True respect for patient autonomy when refusing treatment, however,
would not require patients to evidence their decision-making abilities or justify
their decisions. Though providers may inquire about the patient’s reasons for
refusal in order to clear up any misunderstandings, the patient would not be
required to disclose or need a “good reason” in order to have their treatment
refusal respected. 159 As others have noted, though physicians are legally reBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 147 (describing “a consistent pattern of subordinating patient autonomy to the interests of the medical profession” (first citing Jay Katz, Informed Consent—A Fairy
Tale?, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137 (1977); and then citing KATZ, supra note 61)).
157
Id. at 234, 237 (“If patients are well informed about the treatment options and have made
choices that appear largely consistent with their underlying values, they clearly have the right to refuse
treatment.”).
158
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 234–38 (advising physicians to investigate reasons for refusals);
Kukura, supra note 15, at 749–50 (describing how refusals in obstetric context “may invite mental
health examinations [and] scrutiny of [personal] life”). The definition of “informed refusal” incorporates an understanding requirement rather than just a disclosure requirement. See generally Joseph
Millum & Danielle Bromwich, Informed Consent: What Must Be Disclosed and What Must Be Understood?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 2021, at 46 (arguing that clinician disclosure and patient understanding should not be conflated). This Article does not argue that physicians should not inform their
patients (indeed, they should) or that assumption of risk should not be a defense to negligent informed
consent. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Choosing Medical Malpractice, 93 WASH. L. REV. 891, 915–18
(2018) (describing the assumption-of-risk defense). Rather this Article argues for changes in what
constitutes “understanding.”
159
See generally KATZ, supra note 61 (advocating for extensive discussion between doctors and
patients); Rebecca Dresser, Autonomy and Persuasion, in MALIGNANT: MEDICAL ETHICISTS CONFRONT CANCER 57 (Rebecca Dresser ed., 2012) (arguing that clinicians should seek to clear up mistaken beliefs and should persuade patients to accept beneficial treatment); Samia A. Hurst, When
Patients Refuse Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity: How Should Clinicians Respond?, 164
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1757, 1758 (2004) (arguing that clinicians should engage with their patients when a capacity assessment is refused). This is current law, but this Article contends that it is
not followed in practice and that exceptions to the requirement to obtain informed consent, such as
incapacity, have been abused. There have been debates about whether formal capacity assessments are
respectful of autonomy. See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 100–07 (describing how capacity
156
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quired to disclose information to patients, absent a waiver from patients, patients are under no such obligation to disclose information. 160 Patients can decide how they want to exercise their rights under informed consent law. They
can choose to be informed and decide, to be informed but not decide, not to be
informed nor decide, or not to be informed and decide. 161 Requiring a patient
to demonstrate capacity for rational decision making and then to provide what
healthcare providers consider to be a rational reason for a particular decision
under the guise of needing an “informed refusal” misunderstands patient autonomy rights and interests, which incorporate a right to privacy in decision
making. Additionally, such requirements misunderstand the physician’s role in
patients’ medical decisions. 162 Indeed, if a patient can communicate a refusal,
providers should respect it. 163

assessments interfere with patients’ rights to make their own decisions, but also can ensure that patients do not make decisions counter to their medical wellbeing). Rather than a complete formal capacity assessment, assessing whether patients can communicate a choice is comparatively respectful
of patients’ privacy and legal rights. Id. at 100, 152. Scholars and clinicians may be uncomfortable
with not assessing capacity further, however, because patients may not make good medical decisions
due to inadequate understanding, which by some definitions, is incompatible with autonomy. Id. at
100–01. But see Millum & Bromwich, supra note 158, at 46–48 (arguing that consent is possible
despite incomplete understanding). Even ethicists who argue that patients with impaired capacity
should still be able to contemporaneously refuse treatment in some instances argue that the patient’s
reasoning should be explored, neglecting the privacy interests of patients with decisional impairments.
Navin et al., supra note 51, at 4–6; see also Nina Labovich, Note, Consent, Informed: Rethinking
Informed Consent & Competency for Patients with Schizophrenia & Anosognosia, 62 B.C. L. Rev.
615, 634–37 (2021). It is important to note, however, that requesting a capacity assessment often negatively impacts patients who perceive assessments “as an act of hostility” and lose trust in providers.
Spike, supra note 77, at 99.
160
Donald T. Ridley, Informed Consent, Informed Refusal, Informed Choice—What Is It That
Makes a Patient’s Medical Treatment Decisions Informed?, 20 MED. & L. 205, 209 (2001). But see
KATZ, supra note 61, at 157–58 (noting circumstances under which patients’ refusals should be overridden); Hurst, supra note 159, at 1758–59 (noting that although providers, and not patients, have
disclosure obligations, sometimes competent patients should be treated over their objection if the risks
of nontreatment are significant). This Article should not be read as advocating that physicians not
disclose information to their patients as is currently required under the doctrine of informed consent.
See Schneider & Farrell, supra note 7, at 125–26 (arguing for physician disclosure despite limits to
patient comprehension). Rather, this Article emphasizes patients’ rights of privacy and bodily integrity in cases of treatment refusal.
161
Ridley, supra note 160, at 209; see BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 88.
162
Indeed, an emphasis on decisional capacity permits a substantial “degree of discretion . . . in
the medical profession” and may be used to “look[] not at the . . . decisionmaking process, but at the
decision itself.” BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 103; see also KATZ, supra note 61, at 127–28 (“[T]he
requirement for conversation creates inevitable conflicts with the right to privacy—the right to keep
one’s thoughts and feelings to oneself.”); Navin et al., supra note 51, at 5–6 (noting that even competent patients may not be able to explain why they value what they value).
163
See Wasserman & Navin, supra note 154, at 34–35 (describing how persons with cognitive
impairments can express unwavering, nonarbitrary preferences worthy of respect); Furrow, supra note
130, manuscript at 7.
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It is more justifiable to assess decision-making abilities and reasons when
a patient is seeking treatment. Physicians have a legitimate stake in deciding
whether to provide a particular treatment and may want to decide on the basis
of information from the patient. That is, providers also have autonomy and
professional rights. 164 Refusing a treatment, however, does not require action
or a decision from the physician, and thus there is no entitlement to receive
information from the patient. Physicians can ask their patients questions out of
care and concern but cannot demand information from their patients when they
refuse treatment.
Moreover, aside from privacy considerations and the abuse of capacity
assessments to wield power over patients, there are other reasons to decrease
reliance on capacity assessments, especially when patients refuse treatment. 165
Although there has long been a sound mind requirement to be legally entitled
to make one’s own medical decisions, this rationality requirement is not as
stringent as some may believe if understandings of autonomy and rationality
accord with real world circumstances and typical cognitive capabilities.
In prior work, I have argued that autonomy in late-life healthcare decision
making is best understood as “relational in nature” and that many patients
make decisions “in collaboration with or in consideration of others.” 166 I have
also argued that “‘autonomy’ in healthcare decision-making is [more properly
understood] as agency,” 167 given inherent cognitive limitations on rational decision making, 168 structural constraints on available options, 169 power dynam-

Once [a patient] expresses her wishes, her motivation is irrelevant so long as she remains “competent.” If a right exists, it does not matter what “motivates” its exercise.
Nothing in the law suggests that the right to refuse medical treatment may be exercised
only if the patient’s motives meet someone else’s approval.
Furrow, supra note 130, manuscript at 7.
164
See, e.g., Herring & Wall, supra note 24, at 568.
165
See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 61, at 112–13, 118; Navin et al., supra note 51, at 5–6 (noting how
patients may not want to have to explain their values and goals).
166
Wright, supra note 36, at 1081–95; see also BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 32–35 (describing
conceptualizing autonomy as relational to better fit decision-making practices and preferences).
167
Wright, supra note 10, at 264, 280, 323.
168
Id. It is commonly accepted that rationality is “bounded.” See generally KAHNEMAN, supra
note 7 (discussing rational and irrational modes of thinking); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 7 (discussing irrationality and advocating for changes in policy to improve decision making and promote
wellbeing); Wasserman & Navin, supra note 154, at 36 (asserting that all patients have limits to rationality along with the right to make bad decisions).
169
See generally BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 308, 311 (describing lack of choice when patients
cannot afford available medical treatments or when patients live in institutional settings); Wasserman
& Navin, supra note 154, at 33 (noting that all patients have limited options); Susan Sherwin, Relational Autonomy and Global Threats, in BEING RELATIONAL: REFLECTIONS ON RELATIONAL THEORY AND HEALTH LAW 13 (Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer L. Llewellyn eds., 2012) (describing contextual
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ics between providers and patients, and the complex nature of medical information disclosed when the patient is medically vulnerable. 170 Combining these
insights, when patients make healthcare decisions they are exercising relational
agency and research demonstrates that even patients with cognitive impairments are capable of making “decisions that align with their preferences” if
they are supported or otherwise accommodated when doing so. 171
Indeed, there is an evolving understanding of autonomy and capacity for
persons with cognitive impairments embedded in international and state disability law in which equal legal capacity is the goal. 172 This is inconsistent with
the emphasis on rationality in healthcare decision making and the subsequent
empowerment of healthcare providers to use capacity assessments to disregard
the contemporaneous preferences of patients with decisional impairments.
Supported decision-making legislation, for example, facilitates the contemporaneous exercise of relational agency for persons with cognitive disabilities. 173
Its adoption into the laws of several states troubles the reliance on capacity
assessments and surrogate decision makers in healthcare settings when a patient with decisional impairments refuses a recommended medical treatment. A
patient with a formal supported decision-making agreement may be able to
retain legal capacity despite healthcare providers’ determination that they are
not entitled to make their own medical decisions.
Given that complete rationality is impossible for anyone, including physicians, it is necessary to question why this thin and unrealistic conceptualization
of autonomy has been relied upon in the clinical setting and given credence by
courts and scholars. 174 And it is important to determine whether there are better
constraints on autonomy); Sinding et al., supra note 67, at 1095 (“Models of treatment decision making tend to minimize or obscure the social contexts and limits on patients’ choices . . . .”).
170
See generally BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 25, 101–02 (stating most patients cannot understand medical information, especially when sick, and arguing for a reasonable person standard in
determining understanding); NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra
note 7 (discussing why medical decision making is difficult and applying behavioral science to health
law and public policy); Dresser, supra note 159, at 62 (describing how competent patients may be
susceptible to three types of irrationality: fear, denial, and misunderstanding the burdens of various
options); Schneider & Farrell, supra note 7 (describing limits to rational decision making when patients are sick).
171
Wright, supra note 10, at 264, 323. See generally Wasserman & Navin, supra note 154 (arguing that capacity for preferences should be respected).
172
CRPD, supra note 56, art. 12.
173
Wright, supra note 10, at 323.
174
See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 61, at 87, 102, 121–22, 151 (describing physician irrationality);
Thomas et al., supra note 63, at 3. Feminist philosophers argue that this conceptualization of autonomy serves the interests of the powerful while marginalizing the vulnerable. See, e.g., Letitia Meynell,
Introduction: Minding Bodies, in EMBODIMENT AND AGENCY 1, 3–4 (Sue Campbell, Letitia Meynell
& Susan Sherwin eds., 2009); Martha Albertson Fineman, Reasoning from the Body: Universal Vulnerability and Social Justice, in A JURISPRUDENCE OF THE BODY 17, 19, 25–26 (Chris Dietz, Mitchell
Travis & Michael Thomson eds., 2020).
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conceptualizations of patient autonomy and consent in healthcare decision
making.
2. Emphasizing Bodily Integrity
The corporeal interests in law have been relatively neglected. 175 This neglect is problematic because of the body’s importance. The body matters to
patients because “life is . . . mediated by the body and we cannot make use of
our freedom except through the body.” 176 The body matters because of its
“vulnerability [and periods of] dependence.” 177 Indeed, illness and disability
are experienced by the body, as well as feelings of powerlessness and degradation. And the common law recognizes the importance of the body and the ability to protect it legally from invasion and confinement. 178
The body also matters in the law and ethics of informed consent. 179 Indeed, maintenance of bodily integrity is a fundamental interest in tort law generally and the law of informed consent specifically. 180 The requirement to ob175
In contrast, rationality is emphasized. Chris Dietz, Mitchell Travis & Michael Thomson, Nobody, Anybody, Somebody, Everybody: A Jurisprudence of the Body, in A JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
BODY, supra note 174, at 1, 3 (“This separation of law and bodies fails to account for the ways in
which bodies are shaped, constituted and constructed by the institutions that they are imbricated within. As a result, this disembodied conception of law has been critic[ized] . . . as ‘a socially decontextualized, hyper-rational, wilful individual . . . .’” (quoting Anna Grear, ‘Sexing the Matrix’: Embodiment, Disembodiment and the Law—Towards the Re-gendering of Legal Rationality, in GENDER,
SEXUALITIES AND LAW (Jackie Jones, Anna Grear, Rachel Anne Fenton & Kim Stevenson eds.,
2011))). Scholars in other fields have also argued that the body’s centrality tends to be inappropriately
minimized. See generally ELIZABETH BARNES, THE MINORITY BODY, A THEORY OF DISABILITY
(2016) (describing disability studies); EMBODIMENT AND AGENCY, supra note 174 (describing philosophy); ARTHUR W. FRANK, THE WOUNDED STORYTELLER: BODY, ILLNESS, AND ETHICS (2d ed.
2013) (describing medical ethics); ALLISON JAMES & JENNY HOCKEY, EMBODYING HEALTH IDENTITIES (2007) (describing sociology of health); CHRIS SHILLING, THE BODY AND SOCIAL THEORY (2d
ed. 2003) (describing sociology).
176
Herring & Wall, supra note 24, at 579 n.63 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS
147–48 (Louis Infield trans., Harper & Row 1963) (1920)).
177
O. CARTER SNEAD, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN: THE CASE FOR THE BODY IN PUBLIC
BIOETHICS 3 (2020); Fineman, supra note 174, at 21.
178
ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 36, 42 (2019) (“[T]he
common law believes that unwanted physical contact is at a minimum distasteful to the person
touched, and often abhorrent. . . . [P]ersons do not want constraint on their prerogative to move
. . . .”).
179
For example, Jay Katz explored what a surgeon might say while interacting with a patient in a
hypothetical conversation highlighting the importance of the body in the context of informed consent:
“After all it is your body that I intend to treat and I can do so in a variety of ways. Since you will have
to live with your body for a long time to come, you must have some opinions about which consequences would be easier or more difficult for you to tolerate.” KATZ, supra note 61, at 126.
180
See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law.”).
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tain patient consent, informed or not, to medical treatment protects the right to
bodily integrity. 181
Bodily integrity is distinct from, but also a component of, autonomy. 182
Autonomy in healthcare decision making can be thought of as deliberately
making choices, perhaps with others, with bounded understanding, and voluntarily. 183 Bodily autonomy is a subset of autonomy; namely, “any exercise of
autonomy (any choice or decision) that . . . is to do with the body.” 184 In contrast, bodily integrity is “the right not to have [one’s] body touched or [one’s]
body interfered with without [one’s] consent.” 185 That is, the right to bodily
integrity “provides for a person’s exclusive use and control over his or her
body”; this right “entails power to exclude all others from the body.” 186 This
right is primarily negative, but also imposes “some positive duties on the state
to protect people against interference by others.” 187
Bodily integrity and autonomy are connected because “bodily integrity [is
central] to persons’ capacity to shape their own lives.” 188 That is, autonomy is
embodied. 189 Indeed, maintenance of bodily integrity can be considered a core,
necessary component of autonomy, as one cannot be autonomous if one cannot
prevent others from interfering with their body. 190 When providers treat pa-

Herring & Wall, supra note 24, at 571 (“[T]he proper place for the right to bodily integrity in
medical law is in cases where a patient is refusing or withdrawing consent to treatment, but it does not
apply to exercises of autonomy that do not directly involve interference with the body.”).
182
See id. at 576–77, 580. Although the discourse of autonomy is privileged in healthcare decision-making law, it is actually only negative freedom that is respected legally. That is, a patient has no
right to a particular treatment—a positive freedom—but instead only the right of refusal. Id. at 567–
68; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 178, at 7, 57 (describing the common-law negative freedom to
“reject invasion” with consent being one exception to this freedom). When healthcare providers decline to administer a treatment a patient requests, this is an autonomy interference and likely legally
permissible.
183
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 5, at 104; see Wright, supra note 10, at 279–82;
Wright, supra note 36, at 1064–68.
184
Herring & Wall, supra note 24, at 568, 575–76.
185
Id. at 568.
186
Id. at 576, 580.
187
Id. at 568 (quoting DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND
AND WALES 241 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1993)); see Lucy, supra note 148, at 59.
188
Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV.
311, 344 (1996); see also Lucy, supra note 148, at 61 (“[F]reedom as non-domination and autonomy
are closely connected—‘it is bound to be easier for people to achieve autonomy once they are assured
of not being dominated by others’ . . . .” (quoting PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 82 (1997))).
189
SHILLING, supra note 175, at 9 (“[I]t is impossible to have an adequate theory of human agency without taking into account the body.”).
190
Herring & Wall, supra note 24, at 568 (“The right to bodily integrity is seen as enhancing and
giving a special strength to an autonomy claim, making it particularly hard to justify an interference.”). This means that even persons with disabilities that prevent movement of the body, such as
181
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tients over their refusal, it is a violation of a patient’s autonomy and bodily integrity. Importantly, patients continue to have bodily integrity interests that providers should respect even if the patients acquire decisional impairments and are
deemed incapable of autonomy, understood as capacity for rationality. 191
Consider a physician providing a medical intervention to an unconscious,
dying patient over a prior refusal expressed via advance directive. Though this
violates both the patient’s autonomy and bodily integrity, the patient may never
experience the dignitary injury to precedent autonomy interests, especially if
they never regain consciousness. 192 When providers treat over an express, contemporaneous refusal of a conscious patient, however, the experience is immediate, profound, and grave—leading to a decrease in wellbeing.
Treating patients over their explicit objection is inconsistent with respect
for a patient’s bodily integrity and therefore inconsistent with patient autonomy, whether defined as precedent or contemporaneous autonomy. Individuals
should not be touched without permission, including in the healthcare setting,
except in exceptional circumstances and only when interfering with the right to
bodily integrity can be justified by some other compelling value, such as preventing physical harm to third parties, and when the appropriate legal process
is followed.

locked-in syndrome, can still maintain bodily integrity and be autonomous if others respect their refusals of touch.
191
Id. at 583 (“[T]he right to bodily integrity is not lost when autonomy is lost . . . .”); see also id.
at 577 (“[A] person’s basis of moral duties towards them . . . is a basis that is broader than their capacity for rational decision-making.”); Wasserman & Navin, supra note 154, at 36 (“A person’s freedom
from bodily coercion is normatively basic, such that deviations from liberty rights require justification. The fact that a coercive act promotes a person’s interests is not sufficient to justify coercion,
even when a person would otherwise make a less-than-fully-autonomous decision.”). But see BERNSTEIN, supra note 178, at 7, 75–76 (noting that the common law denies some freedom on the basis of
mental disability). This Article argues that there should be no understanding requirement to maintain
bodily integrity in a treatment refusal, and that in cases of assent to treatment, bodily integrity can be
maintained without understanding the treatment as long as the patient understands and agrees to having their body intervened upon. See Elizabeth Bromley et al., From “Informed” to “Engaged” Consent: Risks and Obligations in Consent for Participation in a Health Data Repository, 48 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 172, 179 (2020) (arguing that consent without understanding is possible in the research context); Millum & Bromwich, supra note 158, 46–48 (arguing that consent is possible even without
understanding); Schneider & Farrell, supra note 7, at 125–26 (arguing that full understanding is an
impossible goal of informed consent). But see Herring & Wall, supra note 24, at 582 (“The exclusive
use and control of your own body . . . presumes an understanding . . . of the nature and quality of the
actions that are to be undertaken to the body.”); Navin et al., supra note 51 (arguing for assessing
understanding under novel standards of capacity).
192
There should still be a legal remedy for this dignitary harm, however. This Article should not
be read as suggesting that overriding advance directives in such instances is permissible.
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B. Treating Patients Over Objection Decreases Welfare
Another important reason not to treat patients over their objection is that
doing so decreases wellbeing for patients and healthcare providers. The primary purpose of medicine is to heal, so practices that cause demonstrable harm
with questionable benefits, such as treating patients over objection, should be
discontinued. This Section will first focus on patient wellbeing before considering provider wellbeing.
1. Treatment Over Objection Decreases Patient Wellbeing
Beyond promoting patient autonomy, the requirement to obtain informed
consent is also meant to improve patient wellbeing. 193 In part, this is because
patient autonomy and wellbeing are directly connected; that is, when persons
exercise autonomy, they tend to do so in a manner that promotes their own
subjective conceptualization of the good. 194 Further, research has demonstrated
that “informing patients and soliciting their agreement to a treatment plan . . .
promote[s] patient health. . . . [This] can [also] reduce anxiety and depression
about health states, increase adherence, enhance patient satisfaction, and facilitate monitoring of symptoms.” 195 This Article contends that although inforBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 153, 307. This is especially true if wellbeing is defined to include more than medical outcomes. Id. at 153–54.
194
Id. at 24 (“In most cases . . . respect for an individual’s autonomy coincides with promotion of
her well-being. . . . [S]he will act to promote her subjective well-being . . . . Her definition, however,
may not coincide with her objectively determined well-being . . . .”); Herring & Wall, supra note 24,
at 578 (“[T]o act without consent is to act against the person’s own assessment of their well-being
. . . .”); Veit et al., supra note 136, at 22.
195
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 18 (footnotes omitted) (first citing B. Gerle, G. Lunden & P.
Sandblom, The Patient with Inoperable Cancer from the Psychiatric and Social Standpoints. A Study
of 101 Cases, 13 CANCER 1206 (1960); then citing Gerald P. Koocher, Psychosocial Issues During
the Acute Treatment of Pediatric Cancer, 58 CANCER (SUPP. II) 468 (1986); then citing L.A. Slavin,
J.E. O’Malley, G.P. Koocher & D.J. Foster, Communication of the Cancer Diagnosis to Pediatric
Patients: Impact on Long-Term Adjustment, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 179 (1982); then citing Milton
S. Davis, Variation in Patients’ Compliance with Doctors’ Advice: An Empirical Analysis of Patterns
of Communication, 58 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 274 (1968); then citing Milton S. Davis, Variation in
Patients’ Compliance with Doctors’ Orders: Medical Practice and Doctor-Patient Interaction, 2
PSYCHIATRY MED. 31 (1971); then citing Renée C. Fox, EXPERIMENT PERILOUS: PHYSICIANS AND
PATIENTS FACING THE UNKNOWN (Univ. of Pa. Press 1974) (1959); then citing V. Francis, B.M.
Korsch & M.J. Morris, Gaps in Doctor-Patient Communication: Patients’ Response to Medical Advice, 280 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 535 (1969); then citing Joseph W. Schneider & Peter Conrad, HAVING EPILEPSY: THE EXPERIENCE AND CONTROL OF ILLNESS (1983); then citing George C. Stone,
Patient Compliance and the Role of the Expert, 35 J. SOC. ISSUES 34 (1979); then citing D.L. Roter &
J.A. Hall, Studies of Doctor-Patient Interaction, 10 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 163 (1989); then citing
S. Greenfield, S. Kaplan & J.E. Ware, Jr., Expanding Patient Involvement in Care: Effects on Patient
Outcomes, 102 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 520 (1985); and then citing Robert M. Kaplan, HealthRelated Quality of Life in Patient Decision Making, 47 J. SOC. ISSUES 69 (1991)); see also id. at 159,
323–24 (describing how patient participation in decision making leads to compliance with care and
193
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mation is important to many patients’ wellbeing, agreement to the provided
treatment, or lack thereof, has a much greater effect on wellbeing.
As discussed previously, treating patients over their express contemporaneous objection leads to a significant decrease in wellbeing: the exact opposite
outcome patients likely hope for when they seek medical care, and counter to
the goals of informed consent. Healthcare providers may not recognize this
irony if providers understand wellbeing solely in medical terms. If treatment
over patient refusal has a positive health outcome—the patient’s life is saved,
disability is prevented, or the patient recovers from their illness—the provider
may feel as though the provider’s actions were benevolent and therefore ethically justifiable.
If the patient’s experience of the provision or effects of treatment is negative or harmful, however, then their wellbeing may suffer even if understood
solely in medical dimensions. 196 There may be adverse physical effects, 197 especially if patients do not comply with or adhere to follow-up treatment, thus
defeating the provider’s goal in treating the patient over their objection. Patients may also avoid medical care in the future because they do not trust
healthcare providers and feel betrayed by the institution of medicine. 198
More importantly, treating patients over their contemporaneous objection,
especially when using force, likely leads to emotional and psychological distress that can become lasting trauma for the patient. 199 This decrease in psychic
wellbeing stems from a violation of the patient’s bodily integrity. 200 There are
gradations of the seriousness of interfering with bodily integrity. 201 When
treatment is provided without consent but in the absence of refusal or objection, there has not been respect for bodily integrity, but the experience of the
information sharing). See generally King & Moulton, supra note 11 (describing benefits of involving
patients in medical decision making).
196
See, e.g., BURT, supra note 106, at 25 (describing such harms in the civil commitment context); Tolson & Morley, supra note 128, at 311–12 (describing the harms resulting from physical
restraints).
197
See, e.g., Kukura, supra note 15, at 754–57 (discussing the obstetric context).
198
See, e.g., id. at 727; Morris et al., supra note 113, at 10 (describing how women who experience birth trauma later avoid hospitals); see also Spike, supra note 77, at 99 (describing the loss of
trust when physicians request capacity assessments). See generally Carly Parnitzke Smith & Jennifer
J. Freyd, Institutional Betrayal, 69 AM. PSYCH. 575 (2014) (exploring the traumatic effect experienced when institutions harm individuals whose wellbeing the institutions are designed to promote).
199
See, e.g., Morris et al., supra note 113, at 10–11 (describing traumatic effects of forced intervention in childbirth context).
200
Strasser, supra note 108, at 1007 (“The harm is not merely the untoward consequences of such
an invasion, but the invasion itself.” (first citing Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943); then
citing Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74, 82–83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); and then citing Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir 1941))).
201
See Herring & Wall, supra note 24, at 571–75 (describing degrees of interference with the
right to bodily integrity).
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violation may not be as intense. 202 When patients are treated over express contemporaneous objection, especially when use of restraints is required, this is a
much more serious violation of their bodily integrity and security—violations
that are incompatible with wellbeing. 203
Finally, there are also concerns that some types of patients may be more
vulnerable to being treated over their objection, which may lead to wellbeing
disparities on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, social class, and disability,
among other status characteristics. Indeed, some scholars have documented
instances in which patients of color, low-income patients, and younger patients
are more likely to experience treatment over objection. 204
2. Treatment Over Objection Decreases Provider Wellbeing
The harms to patient wellbeing should be a sufficient reason not to treat
patients over their objection. But self-interested healthcare providers should
also know that treating patients over their objection can be detrimental to provider wellbeing. Having to restrain a patient and touch their body over the patient’s express objection may cause providers moral distress. 205 Indeed, by
treating against express objection, providers may experience burnout and depersonalization when they “treat[] patients as objects rather than as human be202
Likewise, there has not been respect for their autonomy. It is possible, however, that there is
no effect on the patient’s wellbeing because the patient would have consented to the intervention had
they been given the opportunity to do so.
203
Indeed, capabilities philosophers argue that in order to flourish, one must have bodily integrity. Martha Nussbaum, Human Rights and Human Capabilities, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 21, 23 (2007).
Treatment over objection may also be a violation of patients’ human rights. See Kukura, supra note
15, at 762 (describing relevant human rights in the obstetric context). There may be some limited
instances in which patients and providers anticipate a treatment refusal in the course of consensual
treatment, however. See infra Section IV.B.2.
204
See, e.g., Kukura, supra note 15, 750 (describing such disparities in nonconsensual obstetric
treatment). See generally Mann, supra note 75 (describing how low-income women are subject to
coercion in contraceptive context); Stearns et al., supra note 134 (describing disparities in the types of
patients who want to be discharged against medical advice); Michael Sun, Tomasz Oliwa, Monica E.
Peek & Elizabeth L. Tung, Negative Patient Descriptors: Documenting Racial Bias in the Electronic
Health Record, 41 HEALTH AFFS. 203, 203–05 (2022) (reporting that Black patients and publiclyinsured patients have more negative descriptions in their medical records, which includes mentions of
treatment resistance and refusal).
205
See FRANK, supra note 175, at 173–74 (describing how some physicians feel like they are inflicting torture on their patients); Wasserman & Navin, supra note 154, at 39 (describing how providers are reluctant to treat patients over their objection); Linda M. Janelli, Suzanne S. Dickerson & Marlene R. Ventura, Focus Groups: Nursing Staff’s Experiences Using Restraints, 4 CLINICAL NURSING
RSCH. 425, 433, 437–38 (1995) (reporting that nurses experience moral distress when restraining
patients because they are “violating patient dignity”); Dawn Perez, Kath Peters, Lesley Wilkes &
Gillian Murphy, Physical Restraints in Intensive Care—An Integrative Review, 32 AUSTRALIAN CRITICAL CARE 165, 173 (2019) (summarizing studies that show that clinicians feel moral distress when
restraining patients because so doing is “a violation of human rights”).
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ings.” 206 Additionally, if providers do not meet their legal obligations because
they do not obtain patient consent to treatment, then they expose themselves to
potential liability. 207
C. Treating Patients Over Their Objection Erodes the Rule of Law
Another compelling reason to refrain from treating patients with or without decisional impairments over their objection is that doing so is often inconsistent with and in defiance of existing law. 208 To the extent that legal compliance is valuable, then healthcare providers should not treat patients over their
objection.
Physicians are not exempt from an obligation to follow the law. 209 Indeed,
the AMA acknowledges this general duty and directs that “[a] physician shall
respect the law” 210 and that “[a] physician shall respect the rights of patients.” 211 If the physician does not believe the law is consistent with patients’
best interests, the AMA advises physicians “to seek changes” to the law. 212
See generally Colin P. West, Liselotte N. Dyrbye & Tait D. Shanafelt, Physician Burnout:
Contributors, Consequences and Solutions, 283 J. INTERNAL MED. 516 (2018) (discussing the state of
burnout among doctors and its implications).
207
See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Clinicians May Not Administer Life-Sustaining Treatment Without Consent: Civil, Criminal, and Disciplinary Sanctions, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L.
213 (2013) (describing legal consequences when clinicians provide “unwanted life-sustaining treatment”).
208
As described previously, to treat competent patients in the absence of consent can give rise to
multiple tort claims. Additionally, noncompliance with decisionally-impaired patients’ advance directives refusing treatment violates the Patient Self-Determination Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc. Furthermore,
using a determination of decisional incapacity to disregard the patient’s objection can conflict with the
Americans with Disabilities Act as well as state supported decision-making laws. See generally
Wright, supra note 10 (surveying supported decision-making laws in the United States); Wright, supra note 25 (arguing that federal disability law may require accommodating supported decision making). Finally, treating patients over their objection without a court order is also inconsistent with some
state’s healthcare decision-making laws. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-c(6) (McKinney
2021).
209
But see Peter Koch, How Should Ethics Consultants Weigh the Law (and Other Authoritative
Directives)?, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 768, 771 (2020) (arguing that clinicians may not have a duty to
follow the law).
210
AMA Code of Medical Ethics: AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, supra note 26. Though physicians are not permitted to disregard the law, they are permitted to exercise their conscience to maintain a sense of moral and professional integrity. Physician Exercise of Conscience: Code of Medical
Ethics Opinion 1.1.7, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/physicianexercise-conscience [https://perma.cc/LYM2-7PVB]. Although medical ethics permit providers to act
or refuse to act “in accordance with the dictates of conscience,” there are limits to conscientious objections. Id. One important limit is that physicians still must “[u]phold standards of informed consent
and inform the patient about all relevant options for treatment, including options to which the physician morally objects.” Id.
211
AMA Code of Medical Ethics: AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, supra note 26.
212
Id.
206
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When physicians disregard informed consent law and do not respect the rights
of their patients to refuse medical treatment, the rule of law is eroded. These
laws created through the democratic process are nullified, and physicians’
power relative to their patients is inappropriately increased. 213
There has been a significant body of scholarship devoted to theorizing the
rule of law, most of which focuses on public law. 214 Recent scholarship has
challenged the presumption that the rule of law is solely relevant to public law
given that private law serves many of the same values associated with the rule
of law, namely “dignity, autonomy, and liberty (understood as freedom from
interference [and as non-domination]).” 215 Indeed, “private law protects
against arbitrariness [and domination] in much the same way as does the [public] rule of law” 216 and “can be viewed as a constraint upon ‘horizontal’ arbitrariness, by which is meant that it impedes the power . . . deployed by all addressees of the law,” 217 including healthcare providers. 218 In contrast to an understanding of the rule of law as solely applicable to public law, this Article
takes the view that the rule of law “means that people should obey the law and
be ruled by it.” 219
Healthcare providers may violate private law duties and the values that
private law serves when they treat patients over patients’ explicit objection,
whether contemporaneous or conveyed by an advance directive. Treating patients over their objection can erode contract law when providers are noncompliant with their incapacitated patients’ advance directives or if providers do
not respect their patients’ supported decision-making agreement. As private
law theorists have argued: “If any or all of the contracts and other arrangeSee Wright, supra note 58, at 88 (describing physician “nullification of [medical decisionmaking] law”); Megan S. Wright, Commentary, Implementing Ethical and Legal Supported Decision
Making: Some Unresolved Issues, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2021, at 40, 41 (discussing physician “erosion of the rule of law” (citing Wright, supra note 58)). Prior to the development of informed consent
doctrine, “[t]he rule of law in hospitals [could be considered] guided by principles of custody, not
liberty.” KATZ, supra note 61, at 52, 59 (describing constraints on physician “professional authority in
a democratic society” but also how physicians have needed to be reminded of such constraints). But
see Koch, supra note 209, at 771 (questioning whether law must be followed solely because it is the
law).
214
For a discussion of the components of the rule of law, see Lucy, supra note 148, at 42–43, 50.
215
Id. at 54, 61, 62–65 (asserting that the state is not necessary for an account of arbitrariness or
the rule of law).
216
Id.at 43.
217
Id. at 64.
218
The arbitrariness against which rule of law values protect include “when power (or control or
force) is deployed without warrant and legitimacy”; when “power is exercised without warrant by
those who usually or sometimes have warrant to exercise power”; when “a decision-maker exercises
power inconsistently”; or when “a decision, deed, or course of conduct is marked by a defect of reason.” Id. at 46, 48 (footnote omitted).
219
Id. at 54 (quoting Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 LAW Q. REV. 195, 196
(1977)).
213
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ments one enters into can be ended at the whim of another not privy to those
transactions, then those transactions and, in a sense, one’s self are in the thrall
of that other. That is domination, not freedom.” 220 Such domination in the
medical encounter is especially harmful to patients.
When capacitated patients are treated over their contemporaneous objection, this is even more arbitrary. This is because providers do not have legal
warrant to touch their patient without consent and the patient will not know in
advance of forming a treatment relationship whether their right to bodily integrity will be respected. 221 In this case, providers are not obeying the law and
their actions are inconsistent with respect for the rule of law.
Further, when courts rubberstamp healthcare provider requests for treatment orders or do not permit patients to recover for unlawful treatment over
objection, courts fail in their duty to uphold the rule of law by failing to provide “security against interference . . . on an arbitrary basis” and allowing
“domination by others.” 222 Courts need to vindicate patient rights when they
have been violated, including when patients have been unlawfully treated over
their objection, so that patients and their families feel confident that the legal
system can provide justice when they are harmed. 223
Treatment over objection does not further dignity, autonomy, or liberty interests—all of which are rule of law values. If promoting the rule of law is valuable, then this is an independent reason that physicians should not treat patients over their objection.
****
Treating patients over their objection is inconsistent with respect for patient autonomy and bodily integrity and is also detrimental to patient and provider wellbeing. Further, treating patients over their objection may be an instance where healthcare providers nullify the law, leading to an erosion of the
rule of private law. Because autonomy, bodily integrity, wellbeing, and the rule
of law are valued social goods, patients should rarely be treated over their objection, and such treatment should be in accord with the law and protective of
patient rights.
Id. at 63–64 (citing PETTIT, supra note 188, at 63 n.50).
Indeed, this is not a case of “order without law” because many physicians do not treat patients
over their objection, and given the unpredictability of when such treatment will be imposed, this is the
very definition of arbitrariness.
222
Lucy, supra note 148, at 59 (quoting PETTIT, supra note 188, at 51).
223
See Strasser, supra note 108, at 1020 (“The societal interest in the integrity of the legal system
also must be promoted when individuals are subjected to nonconsensual invasions.”); see also KATZ,
supra note 61, at 59 (describing how the law’s veneration for doctors’ expertise has “made it impossible for the law of informed consent to advance patients’ right to self-decision making in significant
ways”).
220
221
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Because both healthcare providers and courts have not upheld patient
rights to refuse medical treatment, the next Part will describe necessary changes to healthcare decision-making laws to promote patient autonomy, wellbeing,
and the rule of law.
III. INFORMED CONSENT LAW AND PRACTICE SHOULD CHANGE TO ENSURE
THAT PATIENTS ARE NOT TREATED OVER THEIR OBJECTION
As previous Parts have demonstrated, treating patients over their objection is harmful in many respects—to patients, providers, and the rule of law.
Ideally, treatments over patient objection should not occur and patients’ right to
refuse treatment should be respected. This requires that informed consent law
and practices change.
Informed consent law should affirm and protect patients’ rights to refuse
medical treatment, and when patients are treated over their objections, conveyed contemporaneously or through an advance directive, there should be a
legal remedy for this wrong. Scholars have documented the difficulty patients
have in recovering for this rights violation because of difficulty with obtaining
legal representation, proving causation in negligent informed consent cases, or
convincing courts that life or improved health are remediable harms. 224 There
are also problems with an overly broad incapacity exception given issues with
and abuses of capacity assessments, along with the retention of bodily integrity
interests of persons with cognitive impairments.
These barriers to plaintiff success require additional changes to the law to
vindicate patients’ rights to refuse medical treatment and maintain bodily integrity. This Part will propose general changes to existing informed consent
law to try to prevent treatment over contemporaneous objection, and failing
this, to provide for a process that is protective of patient rights and that offers a
remedy when providers do not follow the legal process prior to treating patients
over their objection. Section A of this Part highlights one state’s law that can
serve as a model, 225 and Section B of this Part offers additions to the model. 226
A. Model Law
Informed consent law needs to emphasize the importance of consent and
respecting patient refusals, which safeguards patients’ interests in maintaining
bodily integrity. Ideally, informed consent law would grant patients, even those
with decisional impairments, the absolute right to refuse medical treatment
Kukura, supra note 15, at 781–90.
See infra notes 227–231 and accompanying text.
226
See infra notes 232–250 and accompanying text.
224
225
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unless a court orders the treatment, as this accords with the principle of “legal
capacity on an equal basis” as outlined in the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 227 Further, informed consent law would
shift determination of whether patients’ legal rights would be infringed upon
from healthcare providers to courts, the appropriate institution to adjudicate
issues with legal rights. 228
New York’s Family Health Care Decisions Act provides a model law upon which to build. This law accounts for patient treatment refusals in the presence of questionable decisional capacity by providing absolute legal capacity
to refuse medical treatment absent a court order. 229 In New York, a patient’s
objection to medical treatment trumps a finding of decisional incapacity unless
a court deems the patient to be incompetent. 230
Other states should have similar laws, but should also address important
unanswered questions from New York’s law: (1) what legal process providers
should follow; (2) how patients assert their rights; (3) what sanctions there are
for providers who do not follow the legal process; and (4) what relief is available to patients who are treated over their objections in the absence of the mandated legal process. 231 What follows are general guidelines and suggestions
that answer these questions.

CRPD, supra note 56, art. 12, § 2.
Law “offer[s] the best protection for individual liberty and . . . [should] be the ultimate forum
for adjudicating the legitimacy of coercive social power, for rationalizing the principles of social order.” BURT, supra note 106, at 133 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)).
229
The New York law states:
227
228

Notwithstanding a determination pursuant to this section that an adult patient lacks decision-making capacity, if the patient objects to the determination of incapacity, or to
the choice of a surrogate or to a health care decision made by a surrogate . . . the patient’s objection or decision shall prevail unless: (a) a court of competent jurisdiction
has determined that the patient lacks decision-making capacity or the patient is or has
been adjudged incompetent for all purposes and, in the case of a patient’s objection to
treatment, makes any other finding required by law to authorize the treatment, or (b)
another legal basis exists for overriding the patient’s decision.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-c(6) (McKinney 2021). Other states have laws that grant long-term
care facility residents the right to refuse treatment, but generally most states allow for others to authorize a treatment over incapacitated patients’ objections.
230
This Article does not, however, claim that the law is followed in clinical practice.
231
New York’s mental hygiene regulations contain much more detail on the right of mental
health patients to refuse treatment as well as procedures for providers to follow for refusals or when a
patient assents after an initial refusal. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.8 (2022).
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B. Additional Reforms
Although adult patients are legally entitled to make their own medical decisions, healthcare providers may lawfully treat them over their objection if
patients are deemed incapacitated and providers obtain consent from a surrogate or healthcare power of attorney. This exception to informed consent
should be tightened given previously-discussed problems with capacity assessments, as well as the expansion of legal capacity and the recognition of
bodily integrity interests for persons with cognitive disabilities.
State healthcare decision-making laws should therefore unequivocally
state that patients have an absolute right, barring a court order, to refuse medical treatment, regardless of their decision-making abilities. A declarative
statement would have more than symbolic significance, although this is important for affirming rights to bodily integrity for persons with cognitive disabilities. 232 It would function as baseline direction to providers and would unambiguously reduce their authority to override patients’ decisions absent court
involvement. 233
In instances where healthcare providers do not believe their patients have
decisional capacity, the law should direct providers to try to restore capacity if
the patient is amenable. Interventions to restore capacity could include administration of pharmacologic agents that treat psychiatric issues, such as antidepressants, or discontinuing pharmacologic agents that impair capacity, such as
sedatives; 234 including family members, friends, or formal supporters in decision making; 235 or providing assistive technology to aid in communication, all
of which would need patient permission. 236 Alternatively, in the instance of

See KATZ, supra note 61, at 60 (“[S]ymbols can nag and prod and disturb and ultimately bring
about some change.”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2021 (1996) (discussing how law expresses values and can change norms).
233
Additionally, there should be mechanisms for patients to know, assert, and defend their rights.
See Annas, supra note 5, at 11. A hospital ethics committee that includes community representatives,
including persons with disabilities, as well as trained patient advocates can play a role in patient education and mediating patient-provider conflicts.
234
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 239; Umapathy et al., supra note 53, at 31.
235
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 239; Umapathy et al., supra note 53, at 31. Third parties may be
able to assist the patient in decision making but can also act as advocates for the patient in their encounters with healthcare providers. Care should be taken to ensure that third parties are not asked to
aid in treating patients over their objection, however. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 77, at
1300 (describing how clinicians try to involve patients’ families in overriding a treatment refusal);
Morris et al., supra note 113, at 8 (reporting that clinicians may have women’s partners physically
restrain them during forced childbirth interventions).
236
Patients may not be amenable to treatment but may be amenable to these other interventions,
possibly affecting subsequent treatment decisions.
232
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temporary incapacity, providers can wait until capacity is regained. 237 Even if
decisional capacity cannot be restored, healthcare providers may be able to
provide care to patients with decisional impairments without treating them
over their objection if they change how they communicate. 238 Importantly,
however, the law should state that whether or not capacity is restored, the patient retains the right to refuse treatment. Providers should not be under the
impression that if they make attempts to restore their patient’s capacity that
they then have permission to provide treatment over their patient’s objection.
The law should note that providers can continue to discuss with patients
their treatment recommendations; that is, persuasion should continue to be legally permissible. 239 Indeed, if physicians begin to engage in shared decision
making, considered a best clinical practice to promote both patient and physician autonomy, then physicians may be less likely to want to treat patients over
their express objection because they will have decided together not to pursue a
particular treatment. In shared decision making, patients may convey information relevant to their past experiences with a treatment or how their values
conflict with their providers’ medical recommendations, and through this disclosure persuade their provider to change their recommendation.240 Additionally, it may be the case that patients do accept the first recommended treatment
after being persuaded to do so following a series of conversations. 241
237
For example, patients may be in a short-term delirium or be intoxicated, and they can be asked
to decide later. It is also important to note that although providers may have a sense of urgency, it may
not be a true emergency, and it may be possible to delay a decision until capacity is restored.
238
Providers can respect the autonomy of patients with impaired decisional capacity, despite frequent refusals of care, by modifying their interactional style to make patient assent more likely. See
O’Brien et al., supra note 123, at 1, 3–7; see also BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 239 (providing recommendations for how providers can respond when patients refuse treatment); Katz et al., supra note
138, at 39–40 (describing how incompetent patients may eventually accept treatment); Stivers &
McCabe, supra note 77, at 4 (describing how providers can alter their communication style to obtain
patient assent).
239
For an example of language in the mental health context that could be imported into medical
informed consent laws, see, for example, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.8(6) (2021)
(“Nothing in this subdivision shall prevent a treating physician, treatment team, or others involved in
the patient’s . . . care from continuing to explain the proposed treatment to the patient . . . and to seek
his or her voluntary agreement thereto.”). Some researchers have found that refusals are accepted
without further conversation with the patient. Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 77, at 1299 & tbl.4,
1300 & tbl.5. Many scholars argue that providers should not immediately accept a treatment refusal
but instead that this should trigger conversations with patients to ensure that patients are not mistakenly rejecting treatment that is actually consistent with their goals and values. See, e.g., KATZ, supra
note 61, at 125; Dresser, supra note 159, at 63. When physicians question their patients in a manner
respectful of the patient’s privacy and bodily integrity interests, this can be consistent with relational
autonomy. See generally Wright, supra note 36 (describing relational autonomy in end-of-life decision making).
240
See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 238.
241
See Dresser, supra note 159, at 62 (noting that decision making occurs over time, and after an
initial refusal, a patient may decide to accept treatment); Katz et al., supra note 138, at 39–40 (de-
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And if the patient continues to object despite attempts to persuade, this is
a sign of a consistent and serious preference that providers should respect.
Providers may feel more comfortable honoring this genuine preference after
attempts to restore capacity or persuade, even if the result of the patient’s refusal is death or significant disability. Of course, providers should document
their conversations with their patients in the medical record to note consents
and refusals, which will be especially important for liability protection.
The above recommendations involve slowing the healthcare decisionmaking process. If a patient who is refusing treatment has questionable decisional capacity and there is no time to restore it before a medical intervention
would become moot, there is still a role for law, prior either to treating the patient over their objection or not intervening when faced with an adverse health
outcome. The law should allow for emergency applications to judges to determine whether the treatment should be provided. 242 Judges will be the ultimate
decision maker about whether the provider must respect a patient’s refusal. 243
Further, judges are responsible for weighing a patient’s liberty, bodily integrity,
and medical wellbeing interests, with input from medical experts, against any
other compelling interests, and ensuring the law is followed. 244 Judicial involvement would hopefully be rare if medical culture changes and laws such
as those proposed are adopted. By the time a judge becomes involved, howevscribing how 50% of competent patients who initially opposed treatment ultimately consented to it,
and an additional nearly 20% accepted a treatment alternative); Stivers & Timmermans, supra note
77, at 74 (describing how providers transform treatment refusals into assents in the pediatric context);
Thomas et al., supra note 63, at 3 (describing how patient preferences are not necessarily stable over
time and are also context-dependent). Scholars and medical associations correctly assert that the informed consent doctrine does not require physicians to be neutral with respect to their recommendations and allows them to try to persuade patients, but what is left undetermined is how much pressure
they can put on their patients to obtain consent. See BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 67–70; Comm. on
Ethics, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, ACOG Committee Opinion No. 439: Informed
Consent, 114 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 401, 405 (2009) [hereinafter ACOG Opinion No. 439].
Indeed, there may be concerns about when persuasion becomes undue influence. BERG ET AL., supra
note 3, at 234, 237–40; see also Mann, supra note 75, at 4–6 (describing how providers pressure patients into accepting treatment). It is important that persuasion does not turn into coercion, especially
given that patients are in a medically vulnerable state that further decreases their power to resist pressure. Safeguards could include having another clinician, instead of the original physician, talk to the
patient or issuing a verbal reminder that patients can refuse treatment and that such a refusal will be
respected.
242
But see BURT, supra note 106, at 132–33 (arguing that judges should not intervene before physicians decide whether to treat their patients over their patients’ objection).
243
There are procedural due process considerations when healthcare providers are asking courts
to order medical treatment over patient objection. See, e.g., Kukura, supra note 15, at 742–43 (highlighting quick hearings in the absence of counsel). In cases of applications for involuntary treatment
orders, counsel should be available for the patient. This should help prevent sham court proceedings.
244
One such compelling interest may be preventing harm to third parties, such as in the case of
court-ordered tuberculosis treatment to prevent its spread when individuals refuse treatment or to
isolate.
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er, there should already be an indication that the patient is serious about refusal, which should carry significant weight in the judge’s determination. 245
Finally, given the importance of the right to bodily integrity and the necessity of maintaining the rule of law, there should be significant negative
sanctions for healthcare providers who have treated patients over their objection without following the required legal process. The law should provide for
statutory damages, setting a minimum amount that patients will be awarded so
that patients can be guaranteed a recovery for dignitary harms, and so that judicial discretion, which to date has tended to disfavor plaintiffs, will be constrained. 246 The law should also grant additional damages in especially egregious cases of treatment over objection and, to incentivize lawyers to represent
plaintiffs, allow for attorney’s fees. 247
There should be additional sanctions when providers unlawfully treat patients over their objection. For example, the law should direct that if a patient
has refused treatment, a healthcare provider cannot treat the patient over their
objection and then bill the patient or their insurer for the costs of the treatment. 248 The law should also require hospitals and other healthcare organizations to develop policies that comply with the principle that patients always
have the capacity to refuse medical treatment absent a court order. This way, if
a practitioner treats patients over their objection without going to court, they
may lose their employment or medical staff privileges for violating hospital
policy. 249 There should also be protection for whistleblowers affiliated with
hospitals, many of whom will likely be employees who are lower in the hospital hierarchy, such as nurses who are asked to physically restrain patients. Such
Furthermore, if the patient has engaged in advance care planning, judges should dismiss the
emergency petition so that these legal tools continue to have a purpose. Given that most patients do
not engage in advance care planning, when a patient does, this is strong evidence that the patient values their autonomy and bodily integrity, which should be dispositive in cases of conflict with their
healthcare providers.
246
But see BURT, supra note 106, at 139–40 (arguing against certainty in this context because it
may be inconsistent with establishing “motivation . . . for conversation, for negotiation”).
247
An example would be a case in which a patient is restrained—physically or chemically—for
the sole purpose of treating them over their objection. If restraints are not medically indicated or used
in the course of consensual medical treatment, use of restraints should be per se a violation of informed consent law. See infra Section IV.B.2. The law should also be clear that treating patients over
their objection may be a criminal act in some instances. Pope, supra note 11, at 32 n.46 (“While rare,
breaches of informed consent have sometimes resulted in criminal liability.” (citing Thaddeus Mason
Pope & Melinda Hexum, Legal Briefing: Informed Consent in the Clinical Context, 25 J. CLINICAL
ETHICS 152 (2014))).
248
See, e.g., Kapp, supra note 98, at 1936, 1938 (proposing connecting reimbursement for medical care to documentation that attests that providers obtained informed consent, which cannot “guarantee the quality of the [informed] consent process” but can ensure assent).
249
Others have proposed revocation of licensure as a possible sanction. BERG ET AL., supra note
3, at 150 (quoting Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1564 (1970)); Pope, supra note 11, at 32 n.46).
245
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employees need assurance their jobs will be protected should they speak out
against providers who violate patient rights. Additionally, lawyers for hospitals
should be on notice that they may be at risk of professional sanctions if they
knowingly advise healthcare providers to disregard informed consent law and
patients’ rights.
Finally, given the proposed liability, informed consent and medical malpractice law should also provide for limits to liability for providers who follow
the mandated legal process regardless of whether treatment is provided and
regardless of any subsequent non-negligent medical outcomes. 250
These proposed reforms to informed consent law do not envision that
providers will never override a patient’s treatment refusal—contemporaneous
or precedent. Instead, the reforms envision such treatment occurring only rarely and that when it does, a court is the actor deciding the legality of treatment
over objection. To date, courts have permitted physicians to erode the rule of
law and become more powerful relative to both patients and the institution of
law than is warranted. The proposed reforms are meant to shift power over
their bodies back to patients and shift questions of legal rights to the courts.
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
To minimize the chance that adoption of the proposed law will be detrimental to patients, it is important to consider counterarguments seriously. This
Part will explore possible objections to the arguments presented thus far in this
Article. Part A addresses the possibility that the proposed law will cause medical harm. 251 Part B argues that the exceptions to the informed consent need to
be stricter. 252 Part C asserts that patient autonomy is more important than provider autonomy in the case of treatment refusals. 253 Part D explains that extra
time may be necessary to spend on the informed consent process. 254 Part E ar250
Some of these state laws will interact with Medicare requirements and AMA ethical duties that
require safe discharges of patients from inpatient settings. If a patient desires to leave the hospital
against medical advice, and this is documented in the record, providers should first try to convince the
patient to stay until the patient can leave safely, or to stay and receive some other treatment even if it
is not the provider’s recommended treatment. If the patient still wants to leave, they should be permitted to leave. The hospital is not a prison, and if the patient leaves on good terms with providers, providers can continue the conversation about treatment after discharge. But see generally Erick H.
Cheung, Jonathan Heldt, Thomas Strouse & Paul Schneider, The Medical Incapacity Hold: A Policy
on the Involuntary Medical Hospitalization of Patients Who Lack Decisional Capacity, 59 PSYCHOSOMATICS 169 (2018) (arguing that hospitals should develop policies to facilitate holding patients
with decisional impairments against their will). Further, Medicare does not permit reimbursement for
injuries caused from restraints.
251
See infra notes 257–262 and accompanying text.
252
See infra notes 263–268 and accompanying text.
253
See infra notes 269–275 and accompanying text.
254
See infra notes 276–278 and accompanying text.
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gues that legal change is necessary to change provider behavior. 255 Finally, Part
F argues that courts are a necessary component of informed consent law. 256
A. Loss of Life or Health Is an Acceptable Cost of
Respecting Patient Autonomy
The primary normative objection to respecting patients’ treatment refusals
is that preventing death or disability should be the most important consideration in healthcare. Some may prioritize promoting objective medical wellbeing
more than respecting patient autonomy and bodily integrity. 257 Those with this
view may favor hard paternalism in which patients are not entitled to make
decisions that conflict with their providers’ recommendations. 258 Or they may
favor soft paternalism and oppose laws that specifically grant patients legal
capacity, despite having decisional impairments, to refuse medical treatment
on the grounds that these laws will lead to preventable death or disability.
Changing the law to require respecting patients’ treatment refusal absent
resorting to court, regardless of whether patients have decisional impairments,
will indeed result in some deaths that may have been averted through forcible
medical treatment. But it is important not to overstate the extent to which this
will occur. As empirical evidence demonstrates, most patients are willing to
defer to their healthcare providers’ medical judgment, and so only a small minority of patients will: (1) prefer to make their own medical decisions; (2) disagree with their providers’ treatment recommendations; (3) actually refuse
treatment even after attempts at persuasion; and (4) die or suffer irreparable
harm because of a treatment refusal. For this small group of patients, given the
seriousness and stability of their preferences, it is more important to respect
their autonomy and bodily integrity by respecting their treatment refusal than
to treat them over their objection, especially given that their subjective, and
possibly medical, wellbeing will likely decline after forcible treatment. 259 That
is, autonomy should prevail when there is a (likely rare) conflict between autonomy and life.

See infra notes 279–301 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 302–309 and accompanying text.
257
See generally SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM
(2013) (arguing for “coercive paternalism” in the healthcare context).
258
See BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 152, 156 (observing that physicians who focus on medical
wellbeing often do not seem to think patients have legitimate decision-making interests).
259
The third factor is also relevant in this analysis. It may be that the patient does not affirmatively consent to treatment but no longer objects, in which case if the treatment is provided, it is not consensual, but is also perhaps not as significant a harm to bodily integrity interests. See generally Tunzi
et al., supra note 74 (describing differences between informed consent, assent, and nondissent).
255
256

2022]

Resuscitating Consent

941

Further, it is important to consider the role of uncertainty in medicine. It
may be the case that a provider’s diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment recommendations are incorrect, and thus a patient who refuses medical treatment
may not have the poor outcome healthcare providers predict. 260 Additionally, it
may be the case that if the patient were to receive the recommended intervention, they would die or have a decline in their health status. In these circumstances, the treatment refusal is not medically harmful to the patient and may
actually prevent harm. There is no such uncertainty about the guaranteed dignitary harm that occurs when patients are treated over their objection. Even if
death or disability could have been prevented, maintaining subjective wellbeing and bodily integrity is more important than providing treatment.
Proponents of paternalism may also argue that patients will later regret
their treatment refusal when it is too late to intervene to save their life or prevent disability. 261 Regretting one’s decisions is not uncommon in any context,
and indeed is one price of freedom to make decisions. But if policymakers are
concerned that patients will later regret their choice to refuse treatment, the
solution is neither to keep them from making their own decisions, nor to override their refusal. Rather, the solutions are to provide, among other things, information about different medical options, or to tweak the choice architecture
to allow for cooling-off periods, or to grant opportunities either for healthcare
providers to try to persuade and for patients to think through decisions with
trusted others or for patients to regain capacity. The law reforms proposed in
this Article would accomplish this. 262
B. Exceptions Should Not Be Permitted to Overtake the Rule
As discussed previously, there are exceptions to the requirement that physicians must obtain informed consent prior to a medical intervention. This Article does not argue for getting rid of the exceptions, but rather making the exceptions stricter to respect patient autonomy and to promote patient wellbeing
by reducing treatment over objection.
1. Emergency and Capacity Exceptions Should Be Stricter
The emergency exception to the requirement to obtain informed consent
is meant for cases in which there is a medical emergency, an absence of patient
260
See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 61, at 86; Annas, supra note 5, at 10; Kukura, supra note 15, at
740–41; Pieterse et al., supra note 73, at 25.
261
This may be especially troubling in the case of patients with illnesses that impact their decision-making abilities in a cyclical manner—such as mental illness that waxes and wanes over time—
who refuse treatment during a period of impaired cognition.
262
See also KATZ, supra note 61, at 124–25; Dresser, supra note 159, at 62.
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consent, and no time to obtain consent. This exception is important to retain
because in emergencies, the default assumption that a patient desires treatment
is likely correct and time is of the essence to prevent loss of life or health. This
is an example of implied consent. On the other hand, in the case of treatment
over objection, it would be perverse to allow providers to rely lawfully on the
emergency exception to override their patient’s prior treatment refusal. This is
because if permitted to do so, providers could just delay intervention until their
patient’s health status becomes a medical emergency, allowing this exception
to diminish patient rights. 263
Additionally, the incapacity exception is also important to retain. Patients
who are unconscious, for example, should be able to have a surrogate decision
maker authorize or refuse treatment on their behalf even in the absence of an
advance directive. As discussed earlier, however, the capacity exception should
be tightened because many people who are currently disqualified on the basis
of decisional incapacity can make their own decisions, especially if provided
decisional support, and are legally entitled to do so. Further, although the predominant scholarly view is that treatment refusals should be informed, true
respect for patient autonomy and bodily integrity does not require patients justifying their decisions to others or proving their rationality. Though informed
refusals may be ideal, they are unnecessary and cannot be justified on the basis
of the incapacity exception.
2. Treating Patients Over Contemporaneous Objection May Sometimes Be
Necessary to Administer Consensual Medical Care
There may be instances in which providing a medical intervention over an
explicit contemporaneous patient objection or using physical restraints to control a patient may be required to treat a particular illness consensually. For example, a patient may consent to a course of treatment, such as a surgical operation under anesthesia, and experience post-operative confusion wherein they
fight against nursing staff or attempt to remove life-sustaining devices. 264 In
For a discussion of this occurring in the context of noncompliance with advance directives, see
Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 15, at 162–64; Strasser, supra note 108, at 1008.
264
See, e.g., Thomas N. Robinson & Ben Eiseman, Postoperative Delirium in the Elderly: Diagnosis and Management, 3 CLINICAL INTERVENTIONS AGING 351, 352–55 (2008); see also Use of
Restraints: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.2.7, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/
delivering-care/ethics/use-restraints [https://perma.cc/9W94-9ER3] (“All individuals have a fundamental right to be free from unreasonable bodily restraint. At times, however, health conditions may
result in behavior that puts patients at risk of harming themselves. In such situations, it may be ethically justifiable for physicians to order the use of chemical or physical restraint to protect the patient.”);
id. (advising that physicians “[o]btain the patient’s informed consent to the use of restraint[s]”). But
see Tolson & Morley, supra note 128, at 311–12 (describing a lack of evidence on the benefit of re263
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such a situation, the post-operative confusion is predictable, and a patient can
make use of a short-term written or oral advance directive to permit the use of
restraints to ensure the medical treatment is successful. Providers can also attempt to prevent delirium from occurring or take other steps to mitigate the
need to use force when providing medical care. 265 However, it is important that
healthcare providers are not permitted to broaden this exception beyond very
specific medical circumstances. Otherwise, the right for patients to change
their mind and refuse treatment after a course of treatment has begun will be
nonexistent.
3. Preventing Harm to Third Parties Is Generally Insufficient to Justify
Treatment Over Objection
Sometimes providing medical treatment over someone’s objection is justified by reason of preventing harm to third parties. Though this is ethically justifiable in the instance of someone with a communicable disease who refuses
treatment and isolation because their treatment decision is adversely affecting
others’ physical health, the same rationale does not apply to the case of medical treatment where the patient solely bears the corporeal costs of refusal. 266
Concerns about emotional harm to third parties through a patient’s decision to
refuse treatment, such as family member sadness when the patient’s death is
hastened, should not outweigh respect for the patient’s decision. Preserving bodily integrity is more important than speculative non-physical effects of the treatment decisions on others whose psychic interests are not legally protected. 267
There may be more immediate safety considerations with respect to provision of consensual medical treatment that need to be accounted for. As discussed above, a patient may consent to an intervention, but then have an adverse reaction that causes agitation that in turn poses a risk of physical danger
to nursing and medical staff and the patient. In this case, ensuring healthcare
provider safety and preventing a medical emergency weigh against the need to

straints and overwhelming evidence of harm). See generally Evans & FitzGerald, supra note 131
(describing patient safety reasons for using restraints).
265
See, e.g., Robinson & Eiseman, supra note 264, at 353 (describing prevention as a first step).
266
Public health law, rather than informed consent law, provides legal justification for treatment
over objection in this case.
267
This is not to suggest that family member interests are not important to patient decision making. Indeed, many patients will gladly incorporate others’ interests when making serious medical decisions because “the exercise of autonomy is [often] relational in practice.” Wright, supra note 36, at
1139. When there is a conflict between patient and family decisions, however, the patient’s interests
should ultimately prevail. But see Robert A. Burt, The End of Autonomy, HASTINGS CTR. REP.
(SUPP.), Nov.–Dec. 2005, at S9, S13.
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obtain patient consent to the use of restraints or another medical intervention to
address the agitation. 268
C. Patient Autonomy Trumps Healthcare Provider Autonomy
in the Case of Treatment Refusals
Some may argue that laws that deem patients to have the legal capacity to
refuse medical treatment, excepting a court order, interfere too much with
healthcare professionals’ autonomy. In other words, medicine is a profession,
and physicians are due a certain amount of deference as they practice their profession. Indeed, several “medical associations have advocated against legislative interference with patient care and the patient-physician relationship.” 269
And some scholars have suggested that “[physicians] . . . not permit lawyers or
administrators to set the rules,” 270 whereas others have cautioned against language and interventions that may intensify discord between patients and their
providers. 271
But given decline in patient wellbeing when providers treat patients over
their objection, there should be additional regulation of the medical profession
to prevent this harm. Indeed, informed consent law should weigh patients’ interests more heavily than provider autonomy in order to promote patient wellbeing. 272

See, e.g., Use of Restraints: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.2.7, supra note 264 (“[W]hen a
patient poses a significant danger to self or others, it may be appropriate to restrain the patient involuntarily.”).
269
Pope, supra note 11, at 20 (first citing Statement of Principles on the Role of Governments in
Regulating the Patient-Physician Relationship, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS (July 2012), https://www.
acponline.org/system/files/documents/advocacy/current_policy_papers/assets/sop_issue_brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W5CA-XWUS]; then citing Statement of Policy: Legislative Interference with Patient Care, Medical Decisions, and the Patient-Physician Relationship, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, https://www.acog.org/clinical-information/policy-and-position-statements/
statements-of-policy/2019/legislative-interference-with-patient-care-medical-decisions-and-thepatient-physician-relationship [https://perma.cc/2ZQ4-4PFB] (Aug. 2021); and then citing Jane E.
Brody, Law on End-of-Life Care Rankles Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2011), https://www.nytimes.
com/2011/06/07/health/07brody.html [https://perma.cc/PX8Q-WPYX]); see ACOG Opinion No. 819,
supra note 59, at e38.
270
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 156 (quoting Ronald L. Katz, Informed Consent—Is It Bad Medicine?, 126 W.J. MED. 426, 428 (1977)).
271
See, e.g., Kukura, supra note 15, at 764–65. Other scholars think that the law should privilege
neither physicians nor patients as the ultimate decision maker. BURT, supra note 106, at 43–44, 164–
69.
272
“[H]ealth care law [should] improve the lives of patients.” See Mark A. Hall, Carl E. Schneider & Lois Shepherd, Introduction, Rethinking Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 342
(2006). Laws that facilitate harm to patients, such as laws that allow physicians to override their patients’ treatment refusals should the provider decide their patient lacks capacity, should be changed.
268
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Further, healthcare providers are not experts in legal rights or their patients’ preferences and values, and therefore are not due any professional deference in these matters. Law should cabin healthcare provider expertise and
subsequent professional deference to medical practice. This does not mean that
healthcare providers cannot direct patient care, but rather that their power over
patient decision making stops when a patient refuses medical treatment. This is
because of the importance of maintaining a patient’s bodily integrity, a negative right to prevent others, including physicians, from unwanted physical invasions. Privileging physician autonomy over patient autonomy is more appropriate when patients seek particular medical interventions rather than when
patients refuse treatments. That is to say, physicians can act as gatekeepers to
treatment they provide but cannot impose treatment on patients.
This is closely related to the exercise of physician conscience. Physicians
are ethically and legally entitled to practice medicine on the basis of their conscience. 273 The exercise of conscience does not permit physicians to treat patients unlawfully over their objection, however. Conscience is more properly
exercised in the refusal to participate in care, such as in the case of refusing to
contribute physician aid in dying on the basis of personal moral beliefs. 274
Lawful exercise of conscience cannot be twisted to permit violations of a patient’s bodily integrity. 275
D. Extra Time Is Worth It
It is also necessary to consider the cost of slowing the medical decisionmaking process. Delaying some care may be life-threatening or result in permanent disability, so there may be concerns about loss of life or health when
providers attempt to negotiate with patients. The proposed reforms, however,
do include a path for emergency court petitions that may allay some concerns.
And it is important to note that providers’ sense of urgency may not actually
273
See, e.g., Dana Howard, Civil Disobedience, Not Merely Conscientious Objection, in Medicine, 33 HEC F. 215, 216 (2021) (“[P]hysicians should have considerable latitude to practice in accord
with well-considered, deeply held beliefs.” (quoting Ronit Y. Stahl & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Physicians,
Not Conscripts—Conscientious Objection in Health Care, 376 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1380, 1381
(2017))). See generally id. at 215–31 (discussing differences between conscientious objection and
civil disobedience); Nadia N. Sawicki, The Conscience Defense to Malpractice, 108 CALIF. L. REV.
1255 (2020) (surveying state healthcare provider conscience laws in the reproductive healthcare context).
274
See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 273, at 1304.
275
New York’s law granting legal capacity to refuse medical treatment also contains conscience
provisions. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-n(2)(a) (McKinney 2021). Because of a lack of case law
on the issue, it is unclear whether a provider in New York could treat a patient over their objection on
the basis of their conscience and claim that this is good-faith compliance with the law, limiting their
liability for violating other parts of the law.

946

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 63:887

indicate the presence of a medical emergency, meaning that slowing the decision-making process will not harm the patient. Regardless of whether there is
harm to the patient’s medical wellbeing, it is still the patient’s decision to refuse medical treatment even if the cost of respecting patient autonomy is otherwise preventable death or disability.
Another concern is that it can be time-consuming for physicians to try to
follow the proposed legal process when they respond to a patient’s treatment
refusal in a manner intended to result in the patient receiving the recommended
treatment and that this time may not be compensated. Providers can, however,
bill for time spent talking with their patients. 276 For other parts of the recommended process, such as seeking an emergency court order, physician involvement is not necessary. Instead, other allied professionals such as hospital
lawyers can initiate legal proceedings, and nurses and medical social workers
can spend time negotiating with the patient and coordinating care. 277 Further,
additional billing codes could be created to allow providers to request reimbursement for lengthy informed consent conversations. Finally, others have
argued that “[t]he advantages gained in increased trust, decreased likelihood of
lawsuits, and patient compliance far outweigh the costs in time and effort expended by physicians.” 278
E. Legal Change Is Necessary
Some may question why new statutes are necessary given that tort law
should prevent or allow for recovery in many instances of nonconsensual
treatment, including treatment over objection. But physicians’ legal duties to
patients have not prevented treatment over objection—contemporaneous or
conveyed via advance directive—and patients have been generally unsuccessful in bringing lawsuits after unlawful treatment over objection. Because
healthcare providers have not respected patient rights to autonomy and bodily
integrity and courts have not vindicated violations of these rights, legislative
change is necessary. This Section will first describe how the current law disad-

276
For example, providers are able to bill for advance care planning conversations with Medicare
patients. Megan S. Wright, Change Without Change? Assessing Medicare Reimbursement for Advance Care Planning, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June 2018, at 8, 8–9.
277
Some scholarship has addressed a novel way to provide collaborative services for complex patients. See Kenneth Lam et al., How an Interdisciplinary Care Team Reduces Prolonged Admissions
Among Older Patients with Complex Needs, NEJM CATALYST INNOVATIONS IN CARE DELIVERY, Sept.
2021, at 1, 3–10, https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/CAT.21.0204 [https://perma.cc/2APPJ6K6]; see also Pieterse et al., supra note 73, at 26 (describing how some parts of the decision-making
process can be outsourced to non-physicians).
278
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 65.
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vantages plaintiffs, before moving to discuss how new laws can change medical practice and why significant liability for dignitary harms is necessary.
1. Current Laws Fail Patients
Medical battery claims are appealing to patients for many reasons, but
battery law may not be helpful in remedying treatment over objection. 279 Physicians may defend against a medical battery claim in the context of treatment
over objection by arguing that an exception applies to the requirement to obtain informed consent. 280 Providers may assert that the patient did not have
decisional capacity and thus patient consent to the medical intervention was
not required, or that an emergency existed and there was no time to obtain patient consent. Without making the exceptions to informed consent requirements stricter, as discussed previously, patients will not be as successful bringing battery claims.
Plaintiffs may also bring a negligent informed consent claim if they are
treated over their objection, but again, it is difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.
One barrier for plaintiffs is that tort requires the standard of care be breached.
But if the standard of care is nonconsensual treatment, and physicians provide
such treatment, they have followed the standard of care. 281 Scholars have also
noted the general difficulty in demonstrating causation 282 and harm. 283
Additionally, legal scholars have observed that given how financing medical malpractice claims work, only those with wealth or with a “bad enough”
279
For example, patients do not have to prove physical harm, just lack of consent. Id. at 134–35.
Patients also prefer battery because no expert witnesses are required, and the full range of damages is
available, including punitive. See id.; see also Pope, supra note 11, at 14.
280
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 75–129. Another problem in bringing battery claims is that the
standard is “reasonable person” when considering whether physical contact is offensive, which does
not account for subjective reasons for not wanting to be touched.
281
Kukura, supra note 15, at 779, 783. Similarly, the two different disclosure standards for informed consent may also be problematic for plaintiffs. Id. at 780; see BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at
134–35.
282
There are more elements to prove in negligent informed consent than in medical battery, and it
is thus more difficult for patients to prevail. BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 136. There are multiple
elements of the causation analysis. First, did the disclosure process cause the patient to make a particular decision? And second, did the medical intervention or lack thereof cause the patient harm? Id.
at 136–40.
283
See, e.g., id. at 141 (“In general, recovery may not be obtained if the patient suffers no physical injury. Inadequate disclosure alone . . . is not a legally protected interest under a negligence theory.”); Kapp, supra note 98, at 1935 (observing that it is challenging to establish that “the patient is
demonstrably worse off . . . by virtue of receiving the intervention compared with not receiving it”);
Kukura, supra note 15, at 784–85, 787–88 (describing how nonconsensual obstetric procedures may
not be performed negligently and arguing that juries thus may not understand the harm to the woman,
especially if there is no harm to her child or the harms from the intervention seem typical for childbirth).
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outcome that an attorney will take their case on contingency are going to be
able to find counsel to represent them, a very tiny subset of those who are
treated over objection. 284 Indeed, in medical battery cases where the harm is
dignitary in nature, damages tend to be negligible, disincentivizing lawyers
from taking these cases. 285 Patients who are very ill or who have decisional
impairments may find it even more difficult to obtain representation and initiate a lawsuit. 286 Even when there are other damages, courts may not be willing
to impose liability on physicians which creates another barrier to finding legal
representation. 287
All of these issues result in no effective legal deterrent to disrespecting
patients’ rights when they wish to refuse treatment.
2. New Laws Can Successfully Change Medical Practice
There have been numerous proposals to reform the law to change the practice of informed consent, raising the question of whether the proposals in this
Article will actually have an effect. Indeed, as others have observed, “[T]he law
has had surprisingly little impact on most doctor-patient interactions.” 288
Some may argue that medical culture, regardless of informed consent
laws, will always be opposed to respecting patient autonomy and bodily integrity when patient preferences conflict with providers’ medical judgments. 289
See, e.g., Kukura, supra note 15, at 781–82 (noting how women who endure nonconsensual
treatment during childbirth may not be able to obtain representation unless their child has been
harmed); Pope, Unwanted Cesareans, supra note 15, at 170 (arguing that attorneys need “adequate
reimbursement” in order to bring cases in tort (quoting Brief of Human Rights in Childbirth et al. as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff Rinat Dray at 16, Dray v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No.
500510/14, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 250 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 2019))).
285
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 149.
286
Kapp, supra note 98, at 1935 (“[P]atients who are most at risk for having interventions imposed on them . . . may lack the physical or mental capacity [to initiate a claim].”).
287
For a discussion of how courts do not allow victims of treatment over objection to recover, see
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 132; Kukura, supra note 15, at 778; Strasser, supra note 108, at 1038.
288
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 160–61; see also id. at 161, 310, 320 (asserting that law will not
affect practice because providers manage interactions with patients and are resistant to regulation);
Annas, supra note 5, at 10 (arguing that physicians resist being told how to interact with their patients
by lawyers and judges); KATZ, supra note 61, at 228 (“The radically different climate of physicianpatient decision making . . . cannot be implemented by judicial, legislative, or administrative orders.”);
Kapp, supra note 98, at 1937 (“The abstract, distant threat of a possible civil action is unlikely to
substantially deter many . . . physicians and institutional administrators . . . .”).
289
See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 320 (“Physicians . . . and their attorneys are sufficiently imaginative . . . to devise means of defeating the intent of most legal regulation, perhaps even
masking their response as mechanical compliance with its mandates.”); Cheung et al., supra note 250,
at 171–73 (proposing a policy designed to defend against a false imprisonment claim deriving from
medically detaining a patient against the patient’s will). But see KATZ, supra note 61, at 60 (“Doctors
. . . will have to learn to live at least with the [informed consent] doctrine’s symbolic significance.
While it has always been the fate of symbols to be honored more in words than in deeds . . . symbols
284
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But sufficient legal incentives to ensure patient permission to a medical intervention may be more successful in changing medical practices than proposed
reforms that focus solely on mandated physician disclosures or promoting patient understanding.
Moreover, other recent laws may also assist with changing medical practice with respect to informed consent. More specifically, supported decisionmaking laws that allow for retention of legal capacity may require physicians
to obtain informed consent from their patients with decisional impairments.
Further, the presence of supporters in healthcare settings can help patients assert their legal rights against healthcare providers should this become necessary. 290
But even if the proposed law is adopted, the barrier to legal representation
remains, which can diminish the effectiveness of changing medical practice or
remedying rights violations. Experiential legal education can provide a solution to this problem. Law school clinics provide an opportunity for law students to obtain legal experience under close supervision of a licensed attorney,
and legal services typically are provided pro bono for community benefit. Law
schools with health law curricula may choose to build clinical programs that represent patients in legal proceedings against healthcare providers, which would
help solve the problem of lack of access to representation and civil justice. 291
Should law schools create opportunities for students to represent patients
whose healthcare decision-making rights have been violated, there is a possibility for profound changes to medical culture. This is because many law schools
are located in cities with academic medical centers. If legal clinics brought lawsuits against healthcare providers at medical schools, regardless of whether the
outcome was a settlement or a trial, then perhaps hospital practice and internal
policy would change to prevent treatments over objection, and subsequent lawsuits. 292 The physicians at the academic medical institution are also scholars, and
can nag and prod and disturb and ultimately bring about some change.”). It remains to be seen, however, whether a new generation of physicians—who have grown up having conversations about consent in other contexts, such as affirmative consent in sexual relationships—will shift informed consent
practices even in the absence of legal change.
290
See Crystal Adams & Mica Curtin-Bowen, Countervailing Powers in the Labor Room: The
Doula-Doctor Relationship in the United States, SOC. SCI. & MED., art 114296, at 1, 5–6 (2021) (arguing that doulas can assist pregnant women in resisting coercion).
291
There are questions about how prospective clients would know to reach out to the clinic for
legal assistance that would need to be addressed when designing the clinic.
292
See Kukura, supra note 15, at 798 (“Physicians are more likely to adapt their practices . . .
when . . . guidelines provide clear rules with a ‘credible threat of enforcement’ from outside of the
profession.” (quoting David Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional Organization on Physician
Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583, 596 (1994))). Any cases that did make it to court could help build a
body of case law that may help future patients assert their legal rights and prevail against healthcare
providers who disregard them. In fact, court cases could showcase the diversity of reasons patients
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so they may communicate a changed standard of care to their peers through publication in medical journals, highlighting that treatments over objection are unlawful and unethical and thus influencing wider medical culture.
3. Significant Liability Is Necessary
There may be concerns that the possibility of significant negative sanctions for providers who treat patients over their objection may have unintended
consequences that would harm patients. 293 Healthcare providers may be concerned about potential liability and thus be less likely to treat patients if they
fear their patients will later say that they refused care. This could switch the
current default from saving lives in cases of emergency or patient incapacity,
but the proposed law retains exceptions to the requirement to obtain consent
and also contains limits to liability if physicians follow the legal process. 294
Relatedly, some may be concerned that the proposed law could incentivize physicians not to treat “difficult” patients. But it is not clear how providers
would know in advance which patients would be considered difficult by refusing recommended treatment. If providers are using categories such as gender,
age, race, social class, etc. to predict patient “difficulty,” this raises the possibility that there will be health disparities on these bases. 295 Some patients with
these status characteristics, however, will be protected by nondiscrimination
laws.
Another concern is that some patients who are initially inclined to refuse
a recommended medical treatment will not know enough to ask further questions about their treatment options, along with each options’ risks and benefits.
Medical knowledge correlates with the status characteristics described in the
above paragraph, and so again, there may be health disparities. But the answer
to this concern is not to override a treatment refusal, but instead for physicians
to disclose information about treatment options and then to engage in conver-

refuse treatment and contribute to the development of a “reasonable patient refusing treatment” standard. It is important to note, however, that there is a conflict of interest if the law school clinic clients
are patients suing providers affiliated with a different unit—a medical center—in the same university.
293
See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 159–60 (arguing that punishing physicians will not
benefit patients).
294
Punishment should be reserved for when physicians “knowing[ly] disregard [their] patient’s
legal right[s].” See Strasser, supra note 108, at 1039 & n.301 (quoting Willard H. Pedrick, Arizona
Tort Law and Dignified Death, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63, 82 (1990)).
295
See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 77, at 1299–1300 (finding that some providers allowed
“undesirable patient” refusals). See generally Sun et al., supra note 204 (describing how healthcare
providers may be biased against Black patients and publicly-insured patients).
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sation about their patient’s refusal. Indeed, the proposed law is meant to
prompt conversation and allows for persuasion. 296
There may also be the danger that providers will use this law to refuse to
provide life-sustaining care for vulnerable and marginalized populations, risking use of the law as a cover for rationing care or devaluing some patients’
lives. 297 Concerns about unlawful and unethical rationing of care are somewhat
ameliorated by the statutory duty to treat patients upon admission to hospitals for
emergency medical conditions,298 the ethical duty not to abandon patients,299 and
nondiscrimination laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act. 300
In sum, patients are entitled to recover when their rights have been violated, and healthcare providers need incentives not to treat patients over their objection. 301 It is anticipated, however, that providers will be receptive to changes
in the law and take consent seriously and thus that most severe sanctions will
be rare.
F. Judicial Review Is Warranted to Affirm Patient Rights
and Prevent Erosion of Rule of Law
Some may be opposed to involving judges in the healthcare decisionmaking process as provided for in many current laws and in the proposals outlined in this Article. Reasons for opposition are manifold but include: (1) conExisting scholarship addresses the need for conversation between patients and physicians. See
KATZ, supra note 61, at 130–206; Dresser, supra note 159, at 62. See generally Appelbaum & Roth,
supra note 77 (describing problematic acceptance of treatment refusals without further discussion with
patient).
297
Kapp, supra note 98, at 1937 (describing a need to safeguard against undertreatment for vulnerable groups). Many disability advocates worry about the effect of healthcare decision-making laws
on persons with disabilities, particularly laws that allow patients to die rather than live with a disability. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Ending-Life Decisions: Some Disability Perspectives, 33 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 893, 909–11 (2017). But see Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 15, at 175 (“Enforcement . . .
would ‘send a message that patient rights must be respected, not a message that other patients with a
similar prognosis must decline care.’” (quoting Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Illusion of Autonomy at the
End of Life: Unconsented Life Support and the Wrongful Life Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REV. 673, 695
(1998))); Alicia Ouellette, Disability and the End of Life, 85 OR. L. REV. 123, 126 (2006); Strasser,
supra note 108, at 1040–41 (arguing that legal compliance is about respecting people’s rights to make
their own decisions and is not a statement about the quality of the lives of persons with disabilities).
298
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
299
Terminating a Patient-Physician Relationship: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.1.5, AM.
MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/terminating-patient-physician-relationship
[https://perma.cc/EYB7-GRWF].
300
See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b), 104 Stat. 327,
329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
301
See Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 15, at 168 n.148 (“History establishes that the fear of
liability works, and works quickly.” (quoting Kellen F. Rodriguez, Suing Health Care Providers for
Saving Lives: Liability for Providing Unwanted Life-Sustaining Treatment, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 63
(1999)).
296
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cerns that physicians and patients will become opponents in a legal process,
eroding trust; (2) physicians’ desire to retain autonomy, deference, and control;
and (3) the privileging of medical wellbeing in healthcare decision making. 302
There are also more practical issues with judicial involvement, such as creating
a time delay that could negatively affect patient health, forfeiture of patient
privacy, monetary burdens, and clogging the courts. 303
Yet there are benefits to judicial review of healthcare decision making,
especially when there is a disagreement between patients and providers. For
example, the process can help ascertain the truth of patient treatment preferences if there is uncertainty. 304 More importantly, judges have a role in affirming patients’ legal rights to control what happens to their bodies, preventing
abuse of capacity assessments to disempower patients, encouraging discussion
between patients and their healthcare providers, ensuring that healthcare providers follow the law and obtain patient consent to treatment, and providing a
legal remedy when providers do not. 305 Indeed, judicial oversight in cases of
treatment over patient objection can help shore up the rule of private law. 306
If legal process is to have any true significance for patients’ rights, however, judges must not cede questions of patients’ rights to physicians’ judgments.307
Judges must independently weigh rights to bodily integrity against any harms
that may occur should patients not receive the recommended treatment and uphold healthcare decision-making law. There is evidence from other types of cas302
Kukura, supra note 15, at 742–43 (describing the obstetric context); see BERG ET AL., supra
note 3, at 119–20, 239; BURT, supra note 106, at 120; ACOG Opinion No. 439, supra note 241, at
403.
303
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 120, 239; Paris et al., supra note 107, at 301, 307 (describing
problems with judicial review and arguing that the appropriate adjudicator is a hospital ethics committee); see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J. 1976) (“We consider that a practice of applying
to a court to confirm such decisions would generally be inappropriate, not only because that would be
a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession’s field of competence, but because it would be
impossibly cumbersome.”), receded from by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). But judicial
involvement is the last step in the proposed law, aligning with others’ suggestions that court is the
“last resort to be reserved for otherwise intractable cases with potentially serious outcomes” such as
“when efforts to restore patient competence have failed and the patient’s refusal risks serious disability.” BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 239.
304
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 121.
305
BURT, supra note 106, at 124, 129.
306
See Strasser, supra note 108, at 1039–40 (“Recognizing that imposing life-extending treatment
against the will of the patient can cause a harm only reinforces the established jurisprudence in
torts.”). This Article does not anticipate that judges would override a patient’s treatment refusal except
in very rare cases, and most such cases would likely not be in the medical context, but rather in the
public health context where considerations of the public may legitimately outweigh the individual’s
interests.
307
See BURT, supra note 106, at 133–34 (describing a view of law’s supremacy); KATZ, supra
note 61, at xliii, 58–59 (describing how judges have let doctors remain paternalistic despite a rhetorical “commitment to [patient] self-determination”).
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es that judges sometimes seem to approve pro forma physicians’ requests to treat
patients over their objection, even when the law directs otherwise, thus providing no meaningful protection of vulnerable patients’ rights or respect for the rule
of law. 308 It is important to cabin deference to healthcare professionals to the
medical domain and leave questions of legal rights to legal experts. 309
CONCLUSION: THEORIZING CONSENT
A significant body of scholarship on informed consent has developed
around “information” to the neglect of “consent.” The proposals outlined in
this Article aim to revitalize the importance of consent and strengthen the rule
of private law governing relationships between patients and healthcare providers by preventing treatment over objection and allowing patients to recover
when their rights have been violated.
Many commentators have generally assumed that consent to or refusal of
medical treatment requires patients to be informed and understand the intervention, along with its risks and benefits. 310 This conceptualization of consent
conflates autonomy with rationality, ignoring the bodily integrity interests at
the core of autonomy, and facilitates treatment over contemporaneous patient

308
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 120 (“The result is substantial deference to professional medical
judgment.”); Kukura, supra note 15, at 742–43 (observing that judges’ lack of knowledge of the medical risks of childbirth results in deference to medical professionals); see also Strasser, supra note 108,
at 1039 n.301 (“Such knowing disregard of the patient’s legal right, whether for good motives or ill,
cannot be tolerated.” (quoting Pedrick, supra note 294, at 82)).
309
See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (Mass.
1977) (“We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making responsibility away
from . . . courts . . . to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent.”). But see Susy Lam, MD
vs. JD: Doctors and Judges in Medical Decisions—Who Should Have the Last Say?, IMS MAG., Fall
2014, at 24, 25 (arguing that physicians and not judges should make final medical decisions). Judicial
training is also important. Judges should receive special training on how to respond to requests for a
court order to treat patients over their objection. There is also the question of where hearings will be
held. If a judge is permanently embedded in a hospital to handle disputes such as this, there is the
potential for them to be captured or coopted by medical professionals’ interests. One solution to this is
to have judges be on call, and to have on call responsibilities rotate so one particular judge does not
hear all of these cases. Another possibility would be to have a room set aside in the hospital that could
function like a courtroom so hearings are not at the patient’s bedside and judges are reminded that
they, and not healthcare professionals, were in charge of this legal process and that the outcome is not
guaranteed to be in physicians’ favor. But see Robert A. Burt, Uncertainty and Medical Authority in
the World of Jay Katz, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 190, 192–96 (1988) (critiquing a judge who
used a makeshift courtroom in a hospital for not talking to the patient at her bedside before ruling).
See generally MARA BUCHBINDER, SCRIPTING DEATH: STORIES OF ASSISTED DYING IN AMERICA
(2021) (describing how physicians sometimes have to decide questions of law but are not equipped to
do so).
310
See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 65 (“But it is uncertain whether an apparently competent patient who fails to understand . . . may render a legally valid consent.”).
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objection. 311 It also allows healthcare providers to nullify healthcare decisionmaking law.
This Article has argued against importing a requirement to demonstrate understanding in the case of treatment refusals. Although it may be difficult to obtain agreement on a robust definition of consent, there should be agreement on
what consent is not. 312 Defined in the negative, consent is incompatible with the
use of force or threats, both of which may be required to provide medical treatment in the instance of contemporaneous refusals. 313 Indeed, consent at its core
is permission or authorization. According to dictionary definitions, consent is
assent, and does not include a requirement of rationality or understanding. 314
There are significant harms to patient autonomy, wellbeing, and the rule
of law in the cases of treatment over objection, which is often justified by importing understanding requirements into the act of refusing treatment. Given
these harms, an alternative conceptualization of consent is required. This conceptualization must be one that goes back to the original interests that medical
decision-making law protects—the right to bodily integrity—as well as a
recognition of the embodied nature of the exercise of autonomy.
Perhaps what the law and practice of informed consent should strive for is
obtaining “informed enough assent” from patients prior to medical interventions. 315 The informed component should be defined by what patients want.
311
As discussed earlier, when patients are treated over their objection, the treatment is unlawful
unless an exception to the requirement of obtaining consent applies. In the case of contemporaneous
objection to treatment, providers may try to deem their patients to lack decisional capacity, seek consent from another party or from the patient at a prior time by looking to the patient’s advance directive, and understand themselves to be acting ethically and lawfully and respecting their patients’
precedent autonomy.
312
For example, if a patient agrees to treatment, how can others be sure that the agreement was
“voluntary,” and thus consensual, and that undue pressure was not exerted?
313
BERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 67–70 (“[A] decision obtained by the use of physical force or
the threatened or attempted use of force is highly suspect in its legal and ethical validity.”); ACOG
Opinion No. 439, supra note 241, at 405 (“Informed consent includes freedom from external coercion,
manipulation, or infringement of bodily integrity. It is freedom from being acted on by others when
they have not taken account of and respected the individual’s own preference and choice.”). Ordinary
people also understand consent to be incompatible with threats or force. See generally Roseanna
Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. 2232 (2020) (detailing the disconnect between philosophical and legal theories of consent and ordinary people’s understanding of consent). Other words
are also easier to define in the negative, such as “dignity.” BERNSTEIN, supra note 178, at 45–46.
314
Consent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consent [https://
perma.cc/7T9W-7NJG] (defining consent as “to give assent or approval” or “agree”); see also
BERNSTEIN, supra note 178, at 57 (describing “near synonyms” of consent).
315
Others argue for a minimum of ensuring nondissent to medical treatment, at least in the context of patients with decisional capacity. Tunzi et al., supra note 74 passim; see also Bromley et al.,
supra note 191, at 176–77 (arguing for “informed enough” consent from human subjects in biobanking research); J. Randall Curtis, Commentary, The Use of Informed Assent in Withholding Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the ICU, 14 AMA J. ETHICS 545, 546 (2012) (arguing for “informed assent”
when surrogates prefer that physicians make life-ending decisions); Alexander A. Kon & Denise M.
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Many want more information than they currently receive from healthcare providers, whereas some may want no information at all. Further, the informed
component should not contain an understanding requirement. 316 And the consent component should be defined as assent to having one’s body touched in
the manner the patient was told it would be touched. 317 If there is an understanding requirement for consent, it is about understanding that one’s body will
be intervened upon rather than understanding the risks and benefits of the intervention. There should not be an understanding requirement incorporated
into patients’ rights to refuse treatment. 318 Defining informed consent to a patient-centered informed enough assent and respecting patient dissent will further patient autonomy and bodily integrity interests, as well as subjective wellbeing.
Understanding autonomy as an embodied experience incorporating the
right to bodily integrity, rather than a solely cognitive exercise equating autonomy with rationality, justifies what this Article has argued should be an absolute legal right to refuse medical treatment and empowers patients relative to
their physicians. Using force to touch patients’ bodies cannot be understood as
consistent with respect for autonomy, precedent or otherwise. That is, autonomy is impossible if others can do what they want to a person’s body with no
recourse.
The cost of respecting patients’ treatment refusals may be loss of life or
health, but such costs are only rarely going to be incurred, given that many
patients defer to their healthcare providers. Furthermore, the costs of respect
for patient autonomy and maintenance of bodily integrity are worth incurring,
especially because refusals of medical treatment are unusual and a sign of a
Dudzinski, Navigating End-of-Life Decisions Using Informed Nondissent, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.
2019, at 42, 42–43 (arguing for “informed nondissent” when surrogates prefer that physicians make
life-ending decisions).
316
For those who believe that consent requires understanding of the medical intervention, recent
empirical research has demonstrated that many ordinary people may disagree because they view consent as compatible with deception. Sommers, supra note 313, at 2277–83. Scholars who understand
the consent requirement to protect bodily integrity also downplay the information component of informed consent. See Herring & Wall, supra note 24, at 569 (“While on any reasonable definition of
the right to bodily integrity, treating a patient without consent will breach that right, it is not clear that
a failure to disclose a risk is sufficient to vitiate consent.”). Other scholars assert that consent is possible without complete comprehension. See Bromley et al., supra note 191, at 179; Millum & Bromwich, supra note 158, at 46–50; Schneider & Farrell, supra note 7, at 125–26.
317
See Navin et al., supra note 20, at 1938 (applying the concept of “pediatric assent to adult patients who lack decision-making capacity”). See generally Megan S. Wright, Claudia Kraft, Michael
R. Ulrich & Joseph J. Fins, Disorders of Consciousness, Agency, and Health Care Decision Making:
Lessons from a Developmental Model, 9 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 56 (2018) (applying the concept of
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serious preference worthy of respect. If there are exceptions to the requirement
to obtain patient consent to medical treatment, they should not be determined
by healthcare providers but instead by courts, in order to respect patients’
rights and maintain the rule of private law.

